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THE THREE PERMISSIONS:
PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL AND THE STATUTORY LIMITS
OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Jane Manners & Lev Menand*
Seven words stand between the President and the heads of over a
dozen “independent agencies”: inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office (INM). The President can remove the heads of these
agencies for INM and only INM. But neither Congress nor the courts
have defined INM and hence the extent of agency independence. Stepping
into this void, some proponents of presidential power argue that INM
allows the President to dismiss officials who do not follow presidential
directives. Others contend that INM is unconstitutional because it
prevents Presidents from fulfilling their duty to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed. This Article recovers the lost history of INM,
explaining its origins and meaning, inverting our current understanding of its purpose, and rejecting both challenges to agency
independence. It shows that INM provisions are not removal “protections” that prevent at-pleasure removal; they are removal permissions
that authorize removal where it is otherwise prohibited by an officer’s term
of years, a tenure long understood to bar executive removal for any
reason. INM provisions are narrow exceptions to term tenures: Neglect
of duty and malfeasance in office cash out an official’s failure to faithfully execute official duties, while inefficiency relates to government waste
and ineptitude. INM provisions do not permit the President to remove
agency heads for failing to follow presidential directives. But they do not
clash with the Take Care Clause either, because even on an expansive
reading of the clause, INM provisions authorize Presidents to remove
unfaithful or incompetent officials.
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INTRODUCTION
Independent agencies are government bodies whose leaders do not
serve at the pleasure of the President or other government officials.1
Although independent agencies are common creatures in our political
ecosystem,2 their legality and independence are hotly contested. Prominent jurists argue that some or all conflict with Article II of the
Constitution, which vests “executive [p]ower” in the President and
requires the President to “take [c]are” that the laws are “faithfully executed.”3 Other proponents of presidential power contend that there is no
constitutional problem with independent agencies because independent
agencies are actually subject to a good deal of presidential control. On this
view, the President already has the power under existing law to remove the
heads of independent agencies for failing to follow directives or achieve
White House policy goals.4
Much of this debate centers on the statutory provisions that define
the President’s removal authority. These provisions typically permit the
1. Most definitions of “independent agency” encompass only government bodies
headed by officials who are not removable by the President at will. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen,
Designing Agencies, in Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law 333, 347
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010); Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles,
Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52
Admin. L. Rev. 1111, 1138 (2000); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L.
Rev. 2245, 2376 (2001); Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate over Independent
Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 1988 Duke L.J. 215, 216–17. This Article applies a
slightly different definition that includes officials, like the Comptroller General, whose
“dependence” or “independence” mostly involves another branch of government. See, e.g.,
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The fact that
Congress retained for itself the power to remove the Comptroller General is important
evidence supporting the conclusion that he is a member of the Legislative Branch . . . .”). It
also explicitly excludes government bodies whose leaders are not removable by the
President at will but are removable by officials who serve at the pleasure of the President.
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 303 (2018) (the Bureau of Engraving and Printing). This definition is
narrower than those that treat agency independence as a function of several different factors
of which tenure in office is only one. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 547 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (adopting a broader definition);
Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 3 (1941) (same); Kirti Datla
& Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98
Cornell L. Rev. 769, 772 (2013) (same).
2. See Free Enter., 561 U.S. app. A at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying fortyeight federal independent agencies); infra Appendix B; see also Datla & Revesz, supra note
1, at 786.
3. U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
4. See infra section I.B.1. In an important new article, Professors Cass R. Sunstein and
Adrian Vermeule stake out a modified version of this position, focusing on an official’s
neglect of their statutory duties under the Administrative Procedure Act. Cass R. Sunstein
& Adrian Vermeule, Presidential Review: The President’s Statutory Authority over
Independent Agencies, 109 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=3520879 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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President to remove independent agency heads for cause. Acts creating
the Federal Reserve System,5 the Postal Service,6 and the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA)7 use precisely these words (“for cause”). But most
laws specify three causes: inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in
office (INM).8 Federal agencies with INM provisions in their enabling acts
include the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),9 the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),10 the Office of Special Counsel (OSC),11 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),12 and the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).13 In recent decades, courts have even
read INM provisions into statutes, like the Securities Exchange Act,14 that
do not include them.15
Yet despite the critical role these terms play in shaping the relationship between independent agencies and the President, there is no
consensus about what they actually mean. Neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court has ever defined INM provisions, and in recent years,
appeals court judges have been unable to agree on their scope and, hence,
on the extent of agency independence.16 Can the President remove

5. 12 U.S.C. § 242 (2018).
6. 39 U.S.C. § 202 (2018).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2).
8. See infra section I.A, Appendix B.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1111(c) (2018).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (2018).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1) (2018).
13. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018).
14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
15. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010)
(noting that the President might “intervene” in the SEC only if its determinations are “so
unreasonable as to constitute ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office’”
(quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935))); PHH Corp. v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“[T]he independence of
financial regulators . . . is so well established by tradition and precedent that courts have
assumed these agencies’ heads have removal protection even in the absence of clear
statutory text so directing.”), abrogated by Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140
S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
16. See PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 127–28 (Griffith, J., concurring) (“[T]he meaning of
the standard’s three grounds for removal remains largely unexamined. Congress has
nowhere defined these grounds and the Supreme Court has provided little guidance about
the conditions under which they permit removal.”); Breger & Edles, supra note 1, at 1144–
45 (noting that there is no accepted definition of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office); Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 787 (same); Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 110 (1994) (same);
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1, 29 (1995) (same). The meaning of the related term, “cause,” is also undefined, see John
F. Manning, The Independent Counsel Statute: Reading “Good Cause” in Light of Article
II, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1285, 1306 (1999) [hereinafter Manning, Independent Counsel]
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members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors for keeping interest
rates too high?17 Do statutory limits on the President’s power to remove
agency officials conflict with the President’s constitutional duty to take
care that the laws are faithfully executed?18 The Supreme Court indirectly
addressed these questions eighty-five years ago in Humphrey’s Executor v.
United States,19 but judges and scholars alike are unsure why the Court
decided that case the way that it did. Among other things, the origins of
the INM standard are forgotten, as are the goals of the legislators who
incorporated it into the federal code.20
This Article seeks to recover this lost understanding. It reconstructs
the history of INM and examines its role in federal law. In so doing, it
refutes the conventional interpretation of removal provisions as
“protections”—text that prevents the President from removing independent agency heads at pleasure.21 Rather, it shows that the default runs in the
other direction—against removal, not for it. When officers are appointed
for a “term of years” with the stipulation that the President may remove
them for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office, the
language that protects them from removal at pleasure is not INM—it is the
term of years.22 Since before the Founding, offices held for a term of years,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory language to the contrary, were
designed to be inviolable: Short of impeachment, their holders could not
be removed before the end of their terms. Statutory words like “inefficiency” and “malfeasance” that qualified this protection were permissions—

(noting that the Court has not defined “good cause” in a removal decision), and actively
disputed, with the Supreme Court facing the question this term, see infra note 367.
17. See, e.g., Peter Conti-Brown, Can Trump Fire Jerome Powell? It’s a Political
Question, Wall St. J. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-trump-fire-jeromepowell-its-a-political-question-1544485975 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that Trump might be permitted to remove Powell from his position as Chairman of the
Federal Reserve’s Board); Jeanna Smialek, Trump Redoubles Attacks on Fed Chair, Saying
‘I Made Him’, N.Y. Times (June 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26
/business/jerome-powell-donald-trump.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(contrasting President Trump’s assertions of his ability to fire the Federal Reserve chair with
the requirement that Fed governors only be removed “for cause”).
18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; see also, e.g., Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2191.
19. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632.
20. For an excellent summary of the open issues, see Peter M. Shane, Harold H. Bruff
& Neil J. Kinkopf, Separation of Powers Law: Cases and Materials 514–15 (4th ed. 2018).
21. See, e.g., PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 173 n.1 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In general,
an agency without a for-cause removal statute is an executive agency, not an independent
agency, because the President may supervise, direct, and remove at will the heads of those
agencies.”); supra note 15.
22. For more on the lost history of this tenure and its implications for modern doctrine
and practice, see Jane Manners & Lev Menand, Recovering the Forgotten Tenure of a Term
of Years (June 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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they authorized the removal of officers who were otherwise not
removable.23
Term-of-years offices, like good-behavior offices, have been a feature
of English and American law since at least the eighteenth century.24 They
protect officials from the uncertainty and vulnerability of an “at pleasure”
appointment while still ensuring regular review of their work. Removal
permissions, when added to such offices, serve as a safeguard. They limit,
rather than protect, officeholder independence by authorizing removal
under certain discrete circumstances.
When Congress first used the now-talismanic INM phrase in 1887, it
defined these circumstances using terms that were already well-known.
“Neglect of duty” and “malfeasance in office” were old common law
concepts employed by courts and legislators to connote an officer’s failure
to faithfully execute statutory duties. Neglect of duty indicated instances
of “nonfeasance”—a failure to perform one’s duties in a way that caused
injury to others. At common law, neglect had been grounds for removing
the officers of English towns and boroughs for hundreds of years. It also
constituted a type of “misdemeanor”—or “bad behavior”—that could
trigger the removal of clerks, judges, and other officers appointed for life
to “good behavior” positions. “Malfeasance in office,” meanwhile,
referred to a wrongful act committed in the execution of one’s duties that
caused injury to others. Malfeasance was another type of misdemeanor
that warranted removal from a good behavior office, and it could also lead
to removal in the municipal context.25 Inefficiency, by contrast, was of
newer vintage: a term increasingly used over the course of the nineteenth
century to describe wasteful government administration caused by inept
officers who gained their positions through political connections rather
than merit. Inefficient officials lacked the skills to perform their duties,
rendering them incapable of doing their jobs.26
Congress was not the first legislature to codify INM. All three terms
appeared in state law, with neglect and malfeasance appearing in the laws
of the colonies before that. As Professors Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib, and
23. See infra section II.A. Marbury v. Madison—a case typically read today for its
holding on judicial review—reflects this understanding. When Chief Justice Marshall
describes the dispute as “a plain case for a mandamus,” he is relying on the fact that the
statute authorizing Marbury’s appointment sets a five-year term and makes no mention of
removal. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803); see also An Act Concerning the District of
Columbia, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 107 (1801). Once the office had vested, there was no legal
mechanism for the President to remove Marbury before his five years were up. See infra
section II.A.
24. See infra section II.A. As late as 1978, terms of years were still widely understood as
tenure protections. See infra note 377 and accompanying text. See generally Manners &
Menand, supra note 22 (describing the use of such provisions throughout history).
25. See infra sections II.B.1–.2.
26. See infra section II.B.3.
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Jed Shugerman have shown, early American legislatures often required
officials to take oaths to faithfully execute their duties.27 These laws authorized suit against officials who violated their oaths. Often, these oath
violations were liquidated as “neglect of duty” or “malfeasance in office.”
Over the course of the nineteenth century, state legislatures also used
neglect of duty and malfeasance in office in removal provisions to define
the behavior that might forfeit an office. Sometimes, they made these
words removal grounds for officers otherwise granted tenure for a term of
years, using the security of term-tenure to insulate proficient administrators from partisan political pressure while employing neglect of duty and
malfeasance as a safety valve. This approach became increasingly common
as legislators created offices to oversee ambitious infrastructural projects
such as prisons, canals, banks, and railroads—offices for which term-ofyears administrators who neglected their duty or engaged in malfeasance
could cause immediate and significant harm.28
In 1843, Indiana became the first state to combine neglect and
malfeasance with “inefficiency.” Confronting a massive public finance
crisis caused by defaulting railroad and canal projects, the state included
inefficiency as a ground for removing government officers who were
incapable of performing their duties promptly and effectively.29 Over the
next thirty years, New York, Ohio, and several other states incorporated
inefficiency into removal statutes as well.30
When Congress imported INM into federal law in 1887, it used the
terms to establish the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), a federal
railroad regulator. It empowered the new commissioners to serve for terms
of six years, but it also authorized the President to remove them for INM.31
As the country’s economy grew increasingly technical and complex,
Congress drew repeatedly on this structure, creating “independent
commissions” to regulate the activities of private companies, especially
those providing public infrastructure. Legislators thought of these entities
as “arm[s] of the Congress” operating in a quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial
manner.32 They gave the President removal power, not so the President
might direct the commissions, but so there would be a ready alternative to
impeachment, especially when Congress was out of session. This was how
judges and scholars understood removal statutes when the Court decided
Humphrey’s Executor. And this was how legislators continued to understand
these provisions when they drafted the Federal Reserve Act, created the
27. See Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution
and Article II, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 2111, 2159–62 (2019).
28. See infra section II.C.
29. See infra section II.B.3.a.
30. See infra section II.B.3.
31. See infra section II.C.
32. 91 Cong. Rec. 11,965 (1945) (statement of Rep. Bland).
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Maritime Commission, designed the Civil Service Merit Systems Protection
Board, and set up the FEC.33
Two conclusions follow from the history. First, the law was not
designed to permit the President to remove the heads of independent
agencies for inefficiency or neglect of duty if they do not follow presidential policy directives or if they depart from the President’s agenda. INM
permits removal only in cases where officials act wrongfully in office, fail
to perform their statutory duties, or perform them in such an inexpert or
wasteful manner that they impair the public welfare. In reaching this
conclusion, this Article looks beyond evidence regarding early understandings of INM. It interrogates legislative intent, statutory design, and
the relevant case law. Its results are largely consistent with 150 years of
practice by Presidents, legislators, and agency officials. To accept this
Article’s definitions of INM, one need not accept meanings from centuries
ago, frozen in time. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the understandings recovered here were widely shared until relatively recently.
Second, there is no need to expand the concept of neglect of duty, or
to rely on the concept of inefficiency at all, to square independent
agencies with the Take Care Clause, as some scholars have argued. Neglect
of duty and malfeasance in office, as traditionally interpreted, encompass
what we call a failure of “faithful execution”: the official misbehavior that
the Take Care Clause purportedly obliges the President to prevent. In
other words, even assuming that the Take Care Clause creates a role for
the President in overseeing independent agency officials, most existing
independent agency statutes already allow Presidents to perform this role
by permitting them to remove those who engage in malfeasance or
neglect.
The Court’s recent decision in Seila Law v. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau raises the salience of the analysis presented herein. In
that case, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a divided Court, held that the
design of the CFPB—with a single director appointed to a five-year term,
removable by the President only for INM—violates the Constitution’s
“separation of powers.”34 In reaching this conclusion, five Justices cast
doubt on the idea that INM allows the President to remove officials on the
basis of policy disagreements and stated that the Court had not been
presented with “any workable standard derived from the statutory
language.”35 This Article supplies such a standard.
This Article also provides support for Justice Kagan’s suggestion in
her dissent that there is an equivalence between neglect and malfeasance,
on the one hand, and a failure of faithful execution, on the other.
33. See infra notes 363–364 and accompanying text. See generally Manners & Menand,
supra note 22 (analyzing the history behind the enactment of these provisions).
34. 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
35. Id. at 2206.
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Explaining that INM provisions permit the President to remove for
“incompetence” and a “failure to ‘faithfully execute[]’ the law,”36 Justice
Kagan concluded that statutes limiting the President’s authority to remove
domestic officers who execute the laws do not conflict with the Take Care
Clause so long as the President can remove such officers for cause.37 The
potential implications of the dissent’s interpretation of Article II—
including the extent to which it would permit statutory restrictions on the
President’s power to remove principal officers outside of the independent
agency context—are beyond the scope of this Article. But the majority’s
unwillingness to adopt a broad reading of INM, coupled with the dissent’s
conclusion that INM permits removal for incompetence and a failure of
faithful execution, underscores the significance of this Article’s analysis—
analysis that offers legally grounded definitions of these terms and
provides historical ballast to the hypothesis that neglect and malfeasance
correspond to a failure to faithfully execute the law.38
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews recent scholarly
and judicial treatments of for-cause removal statutes and identifies
unsettled questions. Part II excavates the lost history of removal law and
examines the origins and function of INM. Part III returns to the questions
Part I raises and examines them in light of the evidence Part II uncovers.
I. INTERPRETING REMOVAL STATUTES
Over the past forty years, stark disagreements have emerged
regarding the constitutionality of independent agencies and, relatedly,
how and when INM permits the President to fire independent agency
officials. This Part reviews the removal canon and identifies two unsettled
questions regarding the meaning of INM: whether, on the basis of INM
provisions, the President can fire the heads of independent agencies for
policy disagreements or failing to follow presidential directives; and if not,
whether INM provisions conflict with the Constitution’s Take Care Clause.
A.

The Removal Canon

Over thirty statutes feature either INM or NM as removal grounds.39
At least another twenty authorize the President to remove officials “for

36. Id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (quoting
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).
37. Id. at 2235 & n.9.
38. An earlier version of this Article was publicly available under a different title
(“Faithful Administration and the Limits of Agency Independence”) during the pendency
of this case and was cited by that title in one of the amicus briefs submitted to the Court.
See Brief of Harold H. Bruff et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Court-Appointed Amicus
Curiae, in Support of the Judgment Below at 7, 19, 20, Seila L., 140 S. Ct. 2183 (No. 19-7).
39. For a list of these statutes, see infra Appendix B.
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cause,” which courts and commentators generally understand to encompass removal for INM.40 Despite the contemporary significance of the
question of the President’s power to remove independent agency officials,
the Supreme Court has analyzed these statutes only five times.41 None of
these cases directly consider the meaning of INM or engage with the
relevant legislative history. Several, however, interpret the scope of INM
provisions in general terms.
The seminal case, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, suggests that the
meaning of INM is quite narrow. In that case, the Court concluded that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt improperly removed William Humphrey
from his post at the FTC.42 The relevant statute stated that commissioners
like Humphrey “shall continue in office for terms of . . . seven years.”43
The statute further provided that commissioners “may be removed by the
President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”44
Humphrey was duly appointed by President Hoover.45 But with nearly five
years left on his term, President Roosevelt asked Humphrey to resign,
telling him that “your mind and my mind [do not] go along together on
either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade
Commission.”46 When Humphrey declined, Roosevelt removed him.47
Humphrey sued, arguing that Roosevelt had exceeded his authority.48
In ruling for Humphrey’s estate, the Court cabined its holding in a
controversial case that it had decided nine years earlier, Myers v. United

40. See infra Appendix B. Congress has also restricted the President’s ability to remove
members of the civil service. In 1912, Congress passed the Lloyd–LaFollette Act, which
provided that “no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed
therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service.” Ch. 389, § 6,
37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5501, 3103, 7351 (2018)).
41. The first time was in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903). See infra note
137 and accompanying text. The other times are discussed in the main text that follows. The
canon of Supreme Court cases regarding presidential removal generally is more extensive.
See generally Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (removal of a member of the
War Claims Commission); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (removal of a
postmaster); Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541 (1922) (removal of an army officer);
Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (removal of a U.S. attorney); McAllister v.
United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891) (removal of a territorial judge); Blake v. United States,
103 U.S. 227 (1880) (removal of an army officer); Territory v. Lockwood, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
236 (1865) (removal of a territorial judge); United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1854) (same).
42. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935).
43. Id. at 620.
44. Id. (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 718 (1914)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018))).
45. Id. at 618.
46. Id. at 619.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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States.49 In Myers, the Court had invalidated a provision requiring the
President to obtain the Senate’s consent before removing postmasters.50
According to Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion, “[Article II] grants to
the President the executive power of the government . . . a conclusion
confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”51 Taft reasoned that because requiring the Senate to consent
to the President’s decision to remove a postmaster “would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or other difference[s] with
the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”52
the provision was invalid.53
Distinguishing Myers, the Court in Humphrey’s Executor explained that
the FTC is “an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect
legislative policies embodied in the statute in accordance with the legislative standard therein prescribed [prohibiting unfair competition], and to
perform other specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid.”54
According to the Court, Congress could create such a body, make it “free
from executive control,”55 and “as an appropriate incident” to that power,
“fix the period during which [FTC commissioners] shall continue, and . . .
forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime.”56 “[I]t is quite
evident,” the Court explained, “that one who holds his office only during
the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude
of independence against the latter’s will.”57 Limiting the President to
removing commissioners for cause was necessary to protect “the independence of [the] commission.”58
Fifty years later, the Court appeared to take a different stance in
Bowsher v. Synar, a case involving the Comptroller General of the United
States, who is removable by joint resolution of Congress for various causes,
including INM.59 In Bowsher, the Court, citing comments by two
Congressmen from the early twentieth century, characterized INM as “very
49. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
50. Id. at 176.
51. Id. at 163–64.
52. Id. at 164.
53. For an illuminating discussion of Taft’s drafting process in Myers, including his
vacillation over whether the decision would apply to “‘the removal of Interstate Commerce
Commissioners doing legislative work,’ who ‘may be different from purely executive boards
and therefore not seemingly included in [the] decision,’” see Robert Post, Tension in the
Unitary Executive: How Taft Constructed the Epochal Opinion of Myers v. United States, 45
J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 167, 179 (2020) (quoting Letter from William Howard Taft, C.J., Sup. Ct.,
U.S., to Willis Van Devanter, Assoc. J., Sup. Ct., U.S. (Dec. 30, 1925)).
54. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 629.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 630.
59. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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broad,” explaining that, as “interpreted by Congress, [INM] could sustain
removal of a Comptroller General for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of legislative will.”60 In light of the apparent extent of
legislative control over the office, the Court struck down provisions
granting the Comptroller General what the Court considered to be
executive functions, concluding that assigning such functions to such an
office impermissibly expanded Congress’s reach.61
Three years later, in Morrison v. Olson, the Court mostly sidestepped
the scope of for-cause removal statutes, upholding provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act creating an independent counsel’s office in the Justice
Department.62 The Court reasoned that the Attorney General’s power to
remove the independent counsel for good cause preserved the President’s
ability “to assure that the counsel is competently performing his or her
statutory responsibilities” and, acting through the Attorney General, to
remove the counsel “for ‘misconduct.’”63
In 2010, in Free Enterprise v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of INM.64 Invalidating a statute
authorizing the SEC to remove members of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) only in certain limited
circumstances, the Court noted that “simple disagreement with the
Board’s policies or priorities could [not] constitute ‘good cause’ for . . .
removal.”65 The Court further explained that “even if the President
disagree[d] with [the SEC’s] determination” concerning whether or not
to remove a member of the PCAOB, the President “is powerless to
intervene—unless that determination is so unreasonable as to [itself]
constitute ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”66
B.

The Removal Debate

The question of how to interpret for-cause removal provisions and
whether they comport with the Constitution is now an area of intense focus
for scholars and judges skeptical of agency independence. In the absence
of a definitive judicial interpretation of INM, a debate has emerged
between advocates of executive power. This section first reviews the two
60. Id. at 729; see also infra section III.B (squaring this case with Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)).
61. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 715–16.
62. 487 U.S. 654, 663 (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (2018) (providing that an
independent counsel may “be removed from office . . . only for good cause, physical or
mental disability . . . , or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
[the independent counsel’s] duties”).
63. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the Court’s
opinion in this case, see Manning, Independent Counsel, supra note 16, at 1306–08.
64. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
65. Id. at 502.
66. Id. at 496 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
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divergent positions, one interpreting INM narrowly, the other embracing
Bowsher. Then it examines two judicial decisions involving the enabling act
for the CFPB, the most recent of which, Seila Law, casts doubt on Bowsher’s
broad interpretation but leaves the precise contours of agency
independence undefined.
1. Two Challenges to Agency Independence. — Independent agencies
face a pincer movement. One set of challengers reads INM narrowly.
These scholars posit that the Constitution creates a “hierarchical, unified
executive department under the direct control of the President.”67 And
they argue that laws limiting the President’s ability to remove executive
officials conflict with two constitutional provisions: the Vesting Clause,
which “vests” the “executive Power” in the President, and the Take Care
Clause, which requires the President “take care that the Laws [are]
faithfully executed.”68 The merits and demerits of these arguments
generally are beyond the scope of this Article. But one claim is relevant:
that for-cause removal statutes are, in some circumstances, too narrow to
permit the President to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.69
In part in response to these “unitary executive” theorists, another
group seizes on Bowsher and argues that “the statutory words”—
inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in office—actually “allow a
degree of substantive supervision [of independent agency officials] by the
President.”70 On this view, the “best read[ing]” of these terms, and
existing case law, is that they probably “allow [the President to]
discharge . . . [officials] who have frequently or on important occasions
acted in ways inconsistent with the President’s wishes with respect to what
is required by sound policy.”71 For example, “A commissioner of the FTC
67. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1155, 1165 (1992); see also Steven G. Calabresi
& Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from Washington to Bush
3–4 (2008); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial from the Beginning: The Constitution
of the Original Executive 3 (2015).
68. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 67, at 1175–85, 1207.
69. Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 Ala. L.
Rev. 1205, 1214 (2014) (explaining that the Take Care Clause “is phrased as a duty to ‘take’
care of faithful execution, but such a duty must include a grant of executive power that
allows for fulfillment of the duty”); id. at 1243 (explaining that removal law is what allows
Presidents to fulfill their constitutional duty by “directing and controlling [officials] to take
care of faithful execution”). This claim was central to the Court’s holding in Myers. See supra
notes 50–53 and accompanying text. It also appears in Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
opinion in Free Enterprise. 561 U.S. at 496–97 (“He can[not] . . . ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed . . . . This violates the basic principle that the President ‘cannot delegate
ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to supervise that goes with it,’ because Article
II ‘makes a single President responsible for the actions of the Executive Branch.’” (quoting
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712–13 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment))).
70. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 111.
71. Id.; see also id. at 112 (arguing “that [the President] has far more authority [to
discharge independent agency officials] than is usually thought”).
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might . . . be thought to neglect her duty if she consistently ignores what
the President has said, at least if what the President has said is supported
by law or by good policy justifications.”72 In other words, the President
might “discharge[] as inefficient . . . [those] whom [the President] finds
incompetent because of their consistently foolish policy choices.”73
These scholars hypothesize that the Court could appropriately
embrace a broad reading of inefficiency and neglect of duty in order to
accommodate expansive views of presidential power, including the unitary
executive theory.74 If INM is a “very broad” concept, as the Court in
Bowsher concluded, then the President would “turn[] out to have
considerable power over” independent agencies.75 In other words, “the
‘independent’ agencies would be subject to a significant degree of legally
legitimate presidential oversight.”76
Professor Geoffrey Miller advances a variant of this position,77 arguing
that courts ought to interpret INM more or less broadly depending on the
relevant agency and its characteristics.78 In certain circumstances, courts

72. Id. at 111.
73. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 30; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Places of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
573, 667 n.402 (1984) (hypothesizing that a court might conclude “that a commission’s
refusal . . . to await the results of OMB review of agency comments on a rule[] or to attend
a meeting called to discuss them gave rise to ‘cause’ for removal” such that the President
has “directory power” (emphasis added)); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 203–05 (1986)
(arguing that the “[removal] statutes governing the ‘independent’ agencies should not be
interpreted to foreclose presidential supervisory power of the sort reflected in” executive
orders requiring government agencies to prepare “cost-benefit statements” or orders
similarly “procedural in character”).
74. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 73, at 204.
75. Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 31.
76. Id.; see also id. at 32 (“For those troubled by the independent agency form as a
matter of policy or constitutional law, such an approach would minimize the risks of this
form and promote coordination and accountability in government.”). Manning makes a
similar point with respect to the “good cause” removal standard in the Independent
Counsel statute, suggesting “some preliminary reasons for concluding that” the language
“authorize[s] the independent counsel’s removal for disobeying the President’s legal
directives, at least on matters of reasonably contestable legal judgment.” Manning,
Independent Counsel, supra note 16, at 1288.
77. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 201, 213 (1993) [hereinafter Miller,
Unified Theory]. Miller anticipated the arguments of Sunstein and his coauthors as early as
1986, when he argued that statutes with ordinary INM provisions can “easily be interpreted
as including within the concept of cause the failure of an agency head to comply with the
President’s instructions to take some action otherwise within his or her statutory authority.”
Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 87 [hereinafter Miller,
Independent Agencies].
78. Miller, Unified Theory, supra note 77, at 213 (“While the President rightly enjoys
a very broad scope of interpretative control over the administrative state, that control is not
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should give INM a narrow construction since “Congress could
appropriately vest interpretive powers in an administrative agency, free of
most forms of presidential oversight and control.”79 Miller gives the
example of the Federal Reserve, which is charged with “interpret[ing] a
congressional directive regarding the conduct of monetary policy.”80
Meanwhile, where agencies must be “subject to a high degree of presidential control,” courts could interpret INM provisions more broadly.81
On Miller’s view, agency independence would be somewhat attenuated,
but the precise extent would be decided by jurists on a case-by-case basis.
2. The CFPB Litigation. — In 2018’s PHH Corp. v. CFPB, a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the CFPB, the D.C. Circuit engaged
with both of these views.82 As relevant, the CFPB is led by a single Director
appointed by the President to a five-year term.83 The statute permits the
President to remove the Director for INM.84 PHH Corp., drawing on the
scholarship of the unitary executive theorists and on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Free Enterprise, argued that statutory limits on the President’s
authority to remove the Director unconstitutionally upset the separation
of powers.85
A majority of active judges concluded that it did not, reasoning that
the agency’s “authority is not of such character that removal protection of
its Director necessarily interferes with the President’s Article II duty or
prerogative.”86 According to Judge Cornelia Pillard’s majority opinion,
Congress is constitutionally able to “value and deploy a degree of independence on the part of certain executive officials.”87 In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Pillard noted that “the ability to remove a Director when
cause to do so arises and to appoint a replacement” provides “ample
authority to assure that the [Director] is competently performing his or
her statutory responsibilities,” as “the terms ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty,
or malfeasance in office’ are ‘very broad.’”88
unfettered; the extent of presidential control turns, instead, on the nature of the matter in
question and the context in which the issue arises.”).
79. Id. at 216.
80. Id. (“[A]lthough the consequence of the Fed’s monetary policy decisions are
widely felt throughout the government . . . the instructions about the conduct of monetary
policy that might be contained in legislation are unlikely, in themselves, to have crosscutting implications for other agencies as far as interpretation is concerned.”).
81. Id. at 206.
82. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc),
abrogated by Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c) (2018).
84. Id.
85. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 108–09.
86. Id. at 84.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. at 100 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986)).

16

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1

Judge Pillard did not elaborate. But the meaning of INM was
contested in two concurring opinions by Judge Thomas Griffith and Judge
Robert Wilkins. Judge Griffith argued that INM “provide[s] only a
minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting
him to remove the Director for ineffective policy choices.”89 Inefficiency,
Judge Griffith explained, is a broad concept because “an officer is
inefficient when he fails to produce or accomplish the agency’s ends, as
understood or dictated by the President operating within the parameters
set by Congress.”90 In Judge Griffith’s view, “Congress establishes the
broad purposes . . . and the President assesses whether the officer has
produced the ‘desired effect.’”91
Judge Wilkins disagreed.92 According to Judge Wilkins, inefficiency,
“[a]s interpreted by courts and agencies for nearly a century, “provides a
broad standard allowing for the removal of employees whose performance
is found lacking” due to “incompetence or deficient performance.”93 But
“[w]hat constitutes ‘inefficiency’ has varied depending on the context of
the officer or employee’s responsibilities and functions.”94 In the case of
an independent agency official and the President, Judge Wilkins argued,
inefficiency does not encompass mere policy disagreements.95 Instead,
some sort of incompetence is necessary.96 With respect to the CFPB
specifically, “the promulgation of a rule contrary to consensus expert
advice without sufficient grounds or explanation would subject the
89. Id. at 124 (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment).
90. Id. at 134. Judge Griffith notes that, while “the standard may seem to be a unitary,
general ‘for cause’ provision, the Supreme Court has clarified that these three grounds carry
discrete meanings.” Id. at 131. This Article provides extensive evidence supporting this
proposition. See infra Part II.
91. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 134. In support of his theory, Judge Griffith cites two D.C.
Circuit cases involving the civil service: Meehan v. Macy, where the court held that “[t]here
can be no doubt that an employee may be discharged for failure to obey valid instructions,
or that a discharge for insubordination will promote the efficiency of the service,” 392 F.2d
822, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1968) reh’g on other grounds, 425 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff’d en
banc, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969), and Leonard v. Douglas, which upheld the removal of a
prosecutor whose “professional competence [wa]s not questioned,” but whose superior
found him to be generally “unsuitab[le]” for a “policy-determining position,” 321 F.2d 749,
750–53 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The applicability of civil service cases, such as those cited by Judge
Griffith, involving “efficiency” and failure to follow orders, to cases involving the President
and independent agencies, turns on whether the heads of these agencies (like the civil
service) are under a legal obligation to follow the President’s orders (i.e., whether those
orders have any legal basis).
92. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 123 (Wilkins, J., concurring) (“I do not agree that
‘inefficiency’ is properly construed to allow removal for mere policy disagreements. Such a
capacious construction would essentially remove the concept of ‘independence’ from
‘independent agencies.’”).
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 123.
96. Id. at 122.
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Director to risk of removal for inefficiency.”97 Further, “[T]he Director’s
failure to abide by the stringent statutory requirements of consultation or
coordination would almost certainly constitute ‘neglect of duty’” or
“subject [the Director] to supervision and discipline for ‘inefficiency.’”98
Then-Judge Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion striking a similar
note. “To cabin the effects of Humphrey’s Executor on the Presidency,”
Judge Kavanaugh explained, “some have proposed reading the standard
for-cause removal restrictions in the statutes creating independent
agencies to allow for Presidential removal of independent agency heads
based on policy differences.”99 But “[t]he Free Enterprise Fund Court
expressly confirmed that Humphrey’s Executor ‘rejected a removal premised
on a lack of agreement on either the policies or the administering of the
Federal Trade Commission,’” and Justice Scalia had “once memorably
noted [that] an attempt by the President to supervise, direct, or threaten
to remove the head of an independent agency with respect to a particular
substantive decision is statutorily impermissible and likely to trigger ‘an
impeachment motion in Congress.’”100 On Judge Kavanaugh’s view, “With
independent agencies, the President is limited . . . in essence to indirect
cajoling.”101
In 2020’s Seila Law, a subsequent challenge to the CFPB’s
constitutionality, the Supreme Court appeared to endorse then-Judge
Kavanaugh’s narrow understanding of INM.102 However, in holding that
INM unconstitutionally limited the President’s ability to remove the CFPB
Director,103 the majority once again avoided precisely defining the scope
of INM. Instead, it explained that “while both amicus and the House of
Representatives invite us to adopt whatever construction would cure the
constitutional problem, they have not advanced any workable standard

97. Id. at 121.
98. Id. at 121–22.
99. Id. at 191 n.16 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 191 & n.16 (first quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010); then quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 60, Free Enter., 561
U.S. 477 (No. 08-861)).
101. Id. at 191.
102. See Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2199–200 (2020)
(noting that Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison represent the “outermost constitutional limits
of permissible congressional restrictions on the President’s removal power” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 196 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting))).
103. Characterizing the Director as an official who exercises significant executive power,
the Court explained in a footnote that Article II “expressly entrusts [the President] to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed” and that accordingly no distinction can be drawn
between the President’s constitutional duties in war and “his duty to execute laws passed by
Congress.” Id. at 2206 n.11.
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derived from the statutory language.”104 The dissent, too, declined to offer
a definition. Although it explicitly rejected the argument that INM
permitted the President to remove the CFPB Director for policy
differences, the dissent found no constitutional problem with the agency’s
structure because Congress authorized the President to remove the
Director for “basic incompetence” or a “failure to faithfully execute the
law.”105 Yet in reaching this conclusion about INM’s scope, the dissent
cited only Morrison, omitting discussion of legislative history or other
precedent and postponing once again a definitive resolution to the INM
debate.
II. EXCAVATING REMOVAL LAW
Existing interpretations of for-cause removal statutes are historically
ungrounded. This Part takes up the Court’s call in Seila Law for an interpretation of INM rooted in the statutory text. It resurrects the common
law and statutory basis for removal law in order to define its core
concepts—neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, inefficiency, and,
crucially, terms of years. INM and related removal provisions, this Part
shows, are not protections against an at-will removal, but permissions allowing
the removal of an otherwise unremovable term-tenured officer. Neglect of
duty and malfeasance in office are terms that have been used for hundreds
of years on both sides of the Atlantic by courts and legislatures to articulate
what it means for officers to “faithfully execute” their duties. Inefficiency
was incorporated into statutes by nineteenth-century legislators seeking
also to promote capable government. When lawmakers combined such
removal provisions with offices granted for a term of years, they did so to
strike a balance between security in office—necessary to protect
officeholders from political meddling—and oversight essential to the
performance of key government functions.
A.

Removal Provisions Are Permissions

This section shows that from at least the eighteenth century on, termof-years tenures in both England and America were understood to be
inviolable: Without provisions to the contrary in a controlling statute,
104. Id. at 2206. Leaving the question open for a future case, the majority explained
that, in the absence of any evidence regarding the statutory text, it would “take Congress at
its word that it meant to impose a meaningful restriction on the President’s removal
authority.” Id. at 2207.
105. Id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability and
dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). The use of INM in the CFPB’s enacting
legislation, the dissent explained, “would allow the President to discharge the Director for
a failure to ‘faithfully execute[]’ the law, as well as for basic incompetence. But it would not
permit removal for policy differences.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).
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constitution, or grant of office, an officer serving for a term of years could
not be removed mid-term short of impeachment or other extraordinary
measure.106 As argued at length elsewhere,107 terms for a definite period
were one form of tenure among a menu of options. They struck a balance
between job security and oversight, protecting officers from the
uncertainty and vulnerability of an “at pleasure” appointment while still
ensuring regular review of their performance.
Grants of office in early modern England covered a variety of tenures,
ranging from offices held in fee to offices held at will.108 As Professor
Daniel Birk recently explained, offices had long been conceived of as
property rights,109 and vestiges of the property conception of office remain
to this day: We “take” and “hold” and “forfeit” office, and the roots of the
word tenure—as in “tenure in office”—lie in the Latin “tenere”: “to
hold.”110 Different tenures, it was thought, led to different behaviors. At
common law, for instance, the jurist Matthew Bacon wrote in 1740 that
“Officers of Justice” held life tenures and “could not be removed but for
Misdemeanors,” and this security “was an Encouragement to the faithful
Execution of their Duties” and to the acquisition of “Knowledge and
Experience in their Employments.”111
In the middle of the spectrum of tenures were those offices held “for
Years or a limited Time.”112 Under the prevailing property conception of
office, a term of years was something that its holder possessed—something
defeasible, and something that would descend to the officer’s heirs should
the officer die in the middle of their term. Thus, Bacon explained, offices
106. In addition to impeachment, officers in England and early America could be
removed by an address of both houses, a process generally understood to be less
cumbersome than impeachment. See Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional
Problems 152 & n.137 (1973); see also James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law:
The Law Makers 137 (1950); Ellen Langill, Levi Hubbell and the Wisconsin Judiciary: A
Dilemma in Legal Ethics and Non-Partisan Judicial Elections, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 985, 993
(1998).
107. Manners & Menand, supra note 22. Given this Article’s focus on INM, this section’s
recovery of a term of years is necessarily abbreviated.
108. 3 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law 732 (1740) (“Offices in respect
to their Duration and Continuance, are distinguished in those which are of Inheritance, or
in Fee, or Fee-tail, those of Freehold or for Life, those for Years or a limited Time, and those
which are at Will only . . . .”); see also 1 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 247–50
(3d ed. 1922) (discussing the grants of offices, to be held “in fee, in tail or for life,” as a
perpetuation of feudal ideology that “came very naturally to the mediæval common law”).
109. Daniel D. Birk, Interrogating the Historical Basis for a Unitary Executive, 73 Stan.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 21), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428737 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
110. See Tenure, n., Oxford Eng. Dictionary Online, https://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/199286?p=emailA45iZFwziB8Tg&d=199286 [https://perma.cc/8NHN-J8WY] (last
visited Sept. 28, 2020).
111. Bacon, supra note 108, at 733.
112. Id. at 732.
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“of great Trust concerning the Administration of Justice” should not be
granted for a term of years, because if the officeholder died before the
expiration of the term, “it would go to Executors or Administrators,”
leaving the office “in suspense” until the will was probated, thereby
injuring “the Publick.”113 Moreover, it was unclear whether the office was
even forfeitable in cases of “Outlawry,” a punishment that rendered the
person literally outside the protection of the law.114 An office granted for
a term of years was so secure, Bacon explained, that it should only be
granted to ministerial rather than judicial offices, such as the “Office of
Garbler of Spices in London” or the “Office of Register of Policies of
Assurance in London concerning Merchants.”115
In Revolutionary America, the idea of offices as property was roundly
rejected.116 And yet, while no longer treated as a defeasible property right,
the stickiness of term-of-years offices remained, as evidenced by states’
early constitutions, legislative history, and the statements of Framing-Era
jurists and legal thinkers.117 By 1787, America’s theorists had developed a
clear rule of republican officeholding. Rather than the lengthy list of
tenures that had existed in England, in the United States there were only
three: at pleasure, on good behavior, or for a term of years. And rather
than emanating from the Crown, the power these officers exercised
derived from the people themselves. James Madison described the rule in
Federalist No. 39:
[W]e may define a republic to be . . . a government which derives
all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people, and is administered by persons holding their offices
during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior . . .
[t]he tenure of ministerial offices generally, will be a subject of

113. See id. at 734.
114. Id. at 734, 745–46.
115. Id. at 734.
116. See 1 Annals of Congress 480 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). But see id. at 458
(presenting an argument from South Carolina’s Mr. Smith that officers have a property in
their office that they cannot be deprived of except by impeachment for a criminal
conviction).
117. As Justice William Mitchell explained in 1893, there is nothing “better settled than
that while the incumbent has no vested right of property as against the state, in a public
office [for a term of years], yet his right to it has always been recognized by the courts as a
privilege entitled to the protection of the law,” including due process and judicial review.
State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, 55 N.W. 118, 119 (Minn. 1893). For
another perspective on why a term of years is legally protected, where the Georgia Supreme
Court noted that “[i]t is not a matter of right in the officer, but a question of power in the
agent who undertakes the removal,” see City Council of Augusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463, 465
(1871). We explore these dimensions of term tenure in Manners & Menand, supra note 22.
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legal regulation, conformably to the reason of the case and the
example of the State constitutions.118
To Madison, the duration and terms of ministerial offices—a term he, like
Bacon, used in contradistinction to judicial offices—were up to the
legislature, which would design the tenure “conformably to the reason of
the case,”119 taking into account Bacon’s insight that different tenures lead
to different behaviors and the wisdom derived from previous colonial and
state experimentation.
A handful of other examples from the Early Republic both
demonstrate this understanding of terms of years and suggest one reason
that contemporary observers have forgotten it.120 The first example comes
from a discussion in the House of Representatives on June 29, 1789, a mere
ten days after the debate over the President’s power to remove the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs (a debate that is today known as the “Decision
of 1789”).121 During debate over the establishment of the Treasury
Department, James Madison proposed that the Comptroller of the
Treasury be a term-of-years office.122 Madison thought that such offices
created accountability between an officer and the legislature, and that
such accountability was especially important for the Treasury’s
Comptroller, whose job it would be to adjudicate individual citizens’
money claims against the federal government.123 The duties of such an
officer, Madison reasoned, were “not purely of an Executive nature,”124
and thus “there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should
not hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the
Government.”125 A short term of years would give the Senate a regular
opportunity to refuse the officer’s reappointment.
118. The Federalist No. 39, at 188–89 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008);
see also People ex rel. Lyndes v. Comptroller, 20 Wend. 595, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839)
(noting that the New York State Constitution “provides, that ‘where the duration of any
office is not prescribed by the constitution, it may be declared by law; and if not so declared,
such office shall be held during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment’”
(emphasis omitted) (quoting N.Y. Const. of 1821, art. IV, § 16)).
119. The Federalist No. 39, supra note 118, at 189 (James Madison).
120. For an in-depth examination of these and other examples, see generally Manners
& Menand, supra note 22.
121. The critical House vote on this decision took place on June 19th. See The
Congressional Register (June 17, 1789), reprinted in 11 Documentary History of the First
Federal Congress, 1789–1791, at 999, 1024 (Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling
& Helen E. Veit eds., 1992) [hereinafter Documentary History].
122. 1 Annals of Cong. 611–12 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
123. Id. For more on the legislature’s role in the adjudication of such claims in the Early
Republic, see Jane Manners, Congress and the Problem of Legislative Discretion, 1790–
1870, at 63–113 (Nov. 17, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344925 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
124. 1 Annals of Cong. 611 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
125. Id. at 612.
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Madison’s wish to make the Comptroller “responsible to the public
generally”126 by giving all of the political branches some degree of control
over him127 is itself illuminating, reflecting as it does both a nuanced
understanding of the ways in which different tenures encouraged different
behaviors and the idea that some of the Comptroller’s duties were not
purely “executive.” But for our purposes, what is most interesting is the
language Madison proposed. He suggested amending the bill to state that
“the Comptroller should hold his office during _________ years, unless
sooner removed by the President”128—a term of years, in other words,
conditioned by supplemental removal language. Madison acknowledged
that such a combination—a term-of-years appointment plus mid-term
removability—was rare, but he assured his colleagues that it was not
“altogether novel.”129 Madison’s careful word choice, together with the
fact that he anticipated that his colleagues would cavil at the unusual
tenure combination, indicates that he knew that his contemporaries
understood an ordinary term-of-years tenure to be one that did not allow
for removal.130
126. Id.
127. The House, Madison reasoned, would also exercise control, by setting the officer’s
salary and through the power of impeachment. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. Notably, Madison’s passive voice formulation echoes that of the compromise
reached ten days earlier in the Decision of 1789. See The Congressional Register, supra note
121, at 1028 (discussing the clause “when ever [sic] the said principal officer shall be
removed from office by the president of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy”).
In a persuasive new paper, Professor Shugerman sheds light on the likely motives behind
the Decision of 1789 formulation. According to Shugerman, not only did Madison seek to
persuade his House colleagues to approve the bill even though he lacked the votes for an
unambiguous assertion of an exclusive Article II removal power, but he also sought language
that would permit his allies in the Senate—where hostility to the Senate’s exclusion from
removal decisions understandably ran high—to plausibly deny that the clause gave the
President exclusive removal authority. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of
1789: Strategic Ambiguity and the Imaginary Unitary Executive (Part I) 2–4, 50 (Oct. 7,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596566 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Shugerman ultimately concludes that the Decision of 1789 in fact
decided very little, and that the common reading of its outcome—that the Constitution gave
the President the power to remove officers at pleasure, at least in the absence of language
to the contrary—is mistaken. See id.; see also Jonathan Gienapp, Making Constitutional
Meaning: The Removal Debate and the Birth of Constitutional Essentialism, 35 J. Early
Republic 375, 379–82 (2015) (emphasizing the multiple, confused, and uncertain
approaches to constitutional interpretation employed by debate participants).
For the purposes of this Article, whether Madison and some number of his colleagues
believed the President possessed an Article II-based power to remove is ultimately
immaterial. This Article’s concern is with the ordinary meaning of an office granted for a
term of years, and whether, in the absence of statutory language indicating otherwise, it
allowed for in-term removal. This Article contends that it did not, and that none of the
various readings of the Decision of 1789 disturb this conclusion.
130. Intriguingly, Shugerman concludes that Madison’s June 29th formulation (“unless
sooner removed by the president”), combined with the proposed term of years, was
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Although Madison’s proposal was not adopted, Congress would
ultimately employ its approach—a term of years plus statutory removal
permissions—dozens of times over the next two centuries.131 Indeed,
despite the relative rarity of that tenure combination at that time, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, passed just three months after Madison’s
comptroller proposal, established that “a marshal shall be appointed in
and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable from
office at pleasure.”132 Congress’s choice to start the removability phrase
with the conjunction “but”—a formulation Congress would repeat—
underscores the contrast between the ordinary understanding of a term of
years and the tacked-on removal permission.133
In 1820, Congress used the model again, passing a law that over the
next half century134 helped to routinize at the federal level Madison’s
tenure combination—term of years plus removal at pleasure. The statute,
which was commonly known as the Four Years’ Law, provided that dozens
of jointly appointed officers, including district attorneys and collectors of
customs would be “appointed for the term of four years, but shall be
removable from office at pleasure.”135 Prior to the law’s enactment, these
offices had been removable at pleasure,136 a feature that Congress did not
wish to upset, even as it facilitated rotation in office. To do so, they knew
they had to make their intention explicit, since absent any statutory
language to the contrary, offices granted for a term of years would not
allow presidential removal. The law was quickly folded into appointments
practice, allowing the Senate a regular opportunity to weigh in without
encroaching on the President’s power to remove at pleasure. Looking
back over the history of nineteenth-century politics from our twenty-firstcentury vantage point, it can be easy to forget how unusual the
combination of a term of years with at-pleasure removal had once been.
And it can be easy to forget that, without the Four Years’ Law’s crucial
intended to establish a good-behavior office, rather than a term-limited office held at the
President’s pleasure. See Shugerman, supra note 129, at 20.
131. See infra Appendix B. See generally Manners & Menand, supra note 22
(developing the relevant history).
132. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87. This was only one of many positions
that the First Congress established for a fixed term. Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and
the Patronage 82–83 (1905). Fish concludes that the tenure of federal marshals was
modeled on term-tenured state marshals, and he speculates that the need for rotation in
such an office was related to the marshal’s role in jury selection, a power that “rendered
him more dangerous than the [prosecuting] attorney, whose term is seldom regulated.” Id.
at 83.
133. See generally Manners & Menand, supra note 22 (expanding on this contrast in
greater depth).
134. The law was not repealed until 1887. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
135. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 102, § 1, 3 Stat. 582, 582.
136. See Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1779, 1794
(2006) [hereinafter Prakash, Removal and Tenure].
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phrase “but shall be removable from office at pleasure,” those four-year
appointees would not have been removable at all, in keeping with practice
up to that point.137

137. The history of the Four Years’ Law is critical to understanding the outcome in
Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897), a case that is often read today to stand for the
proposition that a fixed term of years does not restrict the President’s ability to remove at
pleasure. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., DOJ, to the Couns. to the President,
Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the FBI Director: Memorandum
Opinion for the Counsel to the President 3–4 (June 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/
file/18356/download [https://perma.cc/2BCE-5U3B]. Although a comprehensive analysis
of recent case law is beyond the scope of this Article, the correct reading of Parsons is far
narrower. Justice Peckham acknowledges that the opinion’s lengthy Article II analysis is
dicta. Parsons, 167 U.S. at 335 (“It is unnecessary for us in this case to determine the
important question of constitutional power above stated.”). Stripped of this analysis, the
case simply holds that, in light of its legislative history and the confusion generated by the
interaction of the Four Years’ Law with the Tenure of Office Act and its repeal, discussed
infra at notes 346–353 and accompanying text, a statute that appeared to “prohibit[] . . .
removal” of the U.S. attorneys during their four-year terms should not be read to take away
the President’s power, exercised since the Founding, to remove such attorneys at will.
Parsons, 167 U.S. at 334. Such a reading, although perhaps the natural one on the face of
the statute, “could never have been the intention of Congress,” Peckham explains, given
the unusual drafting history of the relevant provision. Id. at 343.
Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903), decided six years later, has also been
misinterpreted in recent years as standing for the proposition that the President might
remove term-tenured officials for other causes notwithstanding language stating that the
President might remove them for INM. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Taft, Frankfurter, and the
First Presidential For-Cause Removal, 52 U. Rich. L. Rev. 691, 699 (2018) (explaining that
the Court in Shurtleff held that an act “authorizing the President to remove [officials] for
[INM] did not prohibit the President from removing [said officials] for other reasons”);
Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 77, at 88 n.170 (“[T]he fact that the statute
specified certain causes for removal [(i.e., INM)] did not exclude the President’s right to
remove for other causes.”). What the Court in fact held was that the President might replace
Shurtleff without cause at pleasure, notwithstanding a provision permitting him to remove
Shurtleff for INM, because the statute did not otherwise specify that Shurtleff should
continue in office for a term of years. According to the Court, in the absence of explicit
tenure-granting language, the Court would not read in tenure for life. The Court thus
interpreted the position as an at-pleasure office, rendering the removal permissions
irrelevant. Shurtleff, 189 U.S. at 318 (explaining that adopting Shurtleff’s interpretation
would mean creating a highly unusual tenure of office, something which the Court “[could
not] bring [itself] to [believe] that Congress ever intended” given its failure to “use
language which would put that intention beyond doubt”); see also id. at 316 (“The right of
removal would exist if the statute had not contained a word upon the subject. It does not
exist by virtue of the grant, but it inheres in the right to appoint, unless limited by Constitution
or statute. It requires plain language to take it away.” (emphasis added)). As explained in
detail elsewhere, Manners & Menand, supra note 22, treatment of a term of years as an
inviolate “term certain” continued mostly uninterrupted through the early 1980s, when
unitary executive theorists succeeded in altering the baseline understanding. See, e.g., A
Bill to Reform the Civil Service Laws: Hearings on H.R. 11280 Before the H. Comm. on Post
Off. & Civ. Serv., 95th Cong. 887–88 (1978).
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A final piece of evidence comes from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion
in Marbury v. Madison.138 At its most basic level, Marbury was a case about a
President’s effort to remove an officer holding an office for a term of years.
As the familiar story goes, right before the end of his term, President John
Adams, together with the Senate, made a series of last-minute appointments, including naming William Marbury a justice of the peace for the
District of Columbia.139 Unfortunately for Marbury, Adams’s Secretary of
State—who was none other than John Marshall, already doubling as Chief
Justice—failed to deliver Marbury’s commission, and the new Secretary,
James Madison, refused. After a ten-month wait, Marbury sought a writ of
mandamus from the Supreme Court ordering Madison to deliver his
commission. Under the act that created the office, Marbury’s lawyer
explained, the position was for a term of five years, full stop. The act gave
the President no authority to remove justices of the peace in the middle
of their terms, and thus none existed.140
The Court agreed.141 Madison had a duty to deliver the commission,
Marshall concluded. Were it not for constitutional limits on the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction, Marshall wrote, this would be “a plain case
for a mandamus.”142 “Some point of time,” he explained,
must be taken when the power of the executive over an officer
[like Marbury], not removable at his will, must cease . . . . [A]s the
law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold for five
years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not
revocable; but vested in the officer legal rights, which are
protected by the laws of his country.143
At the time of the Founding and for at least several decades thereafter,
Marshall’s understanding—that absent statutory or constitutional
language to the contrary, a term-of-years office foreclosed executive
removal—was uncontroversial and widely accepted. It is reflected in

138. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
139. For a detailed account of the multiple roles and responsibilities of a justice of the
peace in colonial Virginia, see George Webb, Office and Authority of a Justice of Peace
(1736).
140. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 151.
141. Id. at 162.
142. Id. at 173.
143. Id. at 157, 162.
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state144 and federal case law, treatises,145 and legislative history throughout
the nineteenth century. Although a comprehensive review of these sources
is beyond the scope of this Article,146 it bears noting that we have found no
nineteenth-century case, at either the state or federal level, in which a
court disavowed this understanding of a term of years, despite more than
one opportunity to do so.147 Even Parsons v. United States, McAllister v.
United States, and Shurtleff v. United States, three Supreme Court opinions
known for their robust vision of the President’s authority to remove executive officers, do not refute the limitations inherent in a term-of-years
office.148 Indeed, we argue in other work that this understanding persisted
144. See, e.g., Townsend v. Kurtz, 34 A. 1123, 1123–24 (Md. 1896) (holding that, where
tenure of office was for a definite term, an officer was rendered removable by language
providing “unless sooner removed by the governor, treasurer, and comptroller”); Speed v.
Common Council of Detroit, 57 N.W. 406, 408 (Mich. 1894) (finding that where an officer
is appointed for a term of years without qualification, no removal is permitted, not even for
cause); Stadler v. City of Detroit, 13 Mich. 346, 347 (1865) (Cooley, J.) (finding that the
appointment of a new marshal halfway through the incumbent’s two-year term did not
remove the incumbent, as “the term of the office being for two years, the council had no
power to limit it to one”); State v. Taylor, 2 Bail. 524, 535–36 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831) (holding
that a term-of-years office was not vacated by the incumbent’s breach of duty where the state
constitution only permitted removal by impeachment).
145. 2 John F. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations 791 (1911)
(“[T]he general rule is that where the [appointment power] is conferred in general terms
and without restriction, the power of removal, in the discretion and at the will of the appointing
power . . . , is implied and always exists, unless restrained [by another law,] or by appointment
for a fixed term.”); James Hart, Tenure of Office Under the Constitution: A Study in Law
and Public Policy 64–65 (1930) (recognizing “different degrees of independence of tenure”
including “relative independence when the officer is chosen for a fixed term of years, and
liable only to impeachment” and a “lower order . . . where the officer is subject to removal,
but only for specified causes, after notice and a public hearing”).
146. For an in-depth examination of these sources, see Manners & Menand, supra note
22.
147. Frequently, federal courts dodged the question. See, e.g., Nebraska Territory v.
Lockwood, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 236, 239–40 (1865) (declining to rule on the lawfulness of the
removal of a territorial judge appointed to an unqualified four-year term on procedural
grounds); United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 292 (1855)
(declining to rule on the lawfulness of the removal of a territorial judge appointed to an
unqualified four-year term on jurisdictional grounds); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175–
76 (declining to issue mandamus ordering delivery of commission on jurisdictional
grounds). But see Goodrich, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 312 (McLean, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court erred in not ruling on the merits, and that once Congress has fixed the tenure of
an office, “the President has no more power to remove a territorial judge, than he has to
repeal a law”).
148. See supra note 137 for discussion of Parsons and Shurtleff. McAllister involved
President Cleveland’s suspension of a territorial judge under the Tenure of Office Act,
which authorized the President to “suspend any civil officer appointed by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, except judges of the courts of the United States.”
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 177 (1891). The Court held that because territorial
judges were not Article III judges, the suspension was lawful under the Tenure of Office Act.
Id. at 184–86. Although the case reached the Court after the repeal of the Tenure of Office
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for most of the twentieth century.149 And at the time of the Interstate
Commerce Act’s passage in 1887, all evidence suggests that this understanding of a term of years was very much intact.
B.

Defining Removal Grounds

Part of the reason that the precise meaning of INM has eluded scholars in recent decades is the erasure of the understanding, dominant
through most of American history, that an unqualified term of years was
inviolable. The previous section’s recovery of that term-of-years understanding thus enables the recovery of the meanings of what we label not
removal protections, but removal permissions: “inefficiency,” “neglect of
duty,” and “malfeasance in office.”
Act, the Court stated explicitly that it was deciding only the lawfulness of the suspension
under the law in force at the time of the suspension and that it was not deciding the
President’s power to remove a territorial judge in the wake of the Act’s repeal. Id. at 178.
Even Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), with its emphatic assertion of the
President’s Article II power to remove executive officers at will, does not squarely address
whether its holding prevents Congress from limiting such a power by establishing an office
for a term of years.
149. Manners & Menand, supra note 22; see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,
353 (1958) (stating that for officials who are “members of a body ‘to exercise its judgment
without the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the
government’ . . . a power of removal exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have
conferred it” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625–26 (1935)));
Federal Election Reform, 1973: Hearings on S. 23, S. 343, S. 372, S. 1094, S. 1189, S. 1303,
S. 1355, and S.J. Res. 110 Before the Subcomm. on Priveleges [sic] & Elections and the S.
Comm. on Rules & Admin., 93rd Cong. 225 (1973) (statement of Robert O. Dixon, Jr.,
Assistant Att’y Gen.) (testifying that the proposed Commission was unconstitutional in part
because the Commissioners’ terms of years, unaccompanied by removal permissions, meant
that they “could not be removed by the President during their term of office”);
Memorandum from Ramsey Clark, Deputy Att’y Gen., DOJ, to Jake Jacobsen, The White
House (July 2, 1965) (stating that where a term is “prescribed by statute, it is reasonably
clear that,” once confirmed, an office holder cannot be removed before the end of that
term). But see, e.g., The Independent Regulatory Commissions: A Report to the Congress
by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government 6 (1949)
(assuming commissioners appointed to terms of years without removal permissions serve at
pleasure). Contrary contemporary interpretations typically cite a 1976 statute prescribing a
ten-year “term of service” for the Director of the FBI. See, e.g., Memorandum from Daniel
L. Koffsky, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., DOJ, to Stuart M. Gerson,
Acting Att’y Gen., DOJ, Removal of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Jan.
26,
1993),
https://www.justice.gov/olc/page/file/1085346/
download, [https://perma.cc/3ZQT-BAFV]; see also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 94-503, sec. 203, § 1101(b), 90 Stat. 2427 (1976) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 532 (2018)). But the legislative history reveals that members of Congress
treated the Director’s term as a tenure the President could probably override under Myers.
And they nonetheless seemed to relish the ambiguity. See S. Comm. on the Judiciary, TenYear Term for FBI Director, S. Rep. No. 93-1213, at 6 (1974) (“The President may well have
illimitable constitutional power to remove an FBI Director, as that office is presently
constituted by law. . . . That the Director of the FBI is within the class of officials subject to
the President’s illimitable power of removal is highly likely.” (citing Myers, 272 U.S. 52)).
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This section proceeds with a brief overview of early removal law before
unpacking the meaning of INM. Neglect of duty and malfeasance in office,
it shows, are terms that have been used for hundreds of years to address
the problem of an officer’s failure to faithfully execute the laws. Courts
have used them to define and analyze the obligations of officeholding,
while legislatures have employed them to motivate an office’s “faithful
execution.” In attempting to legislate faithful execution, these lawmakers
used a range of techniques, including authorizing private suits against
officers for breaching their official duties, separating the power to remove
from the power to appoint, and combining term-of-years appointments
with a limited power to remove for discrete forms of misbehavior.
Inefficiency, meanwhile, was added to the removal lexicon only in the
middle of the nineteenth century, when legislators used the term to
describe wasteful government administration caused by inept officers.
1. The Common Law Roots of Removal Law. — The concepts animating
nineteenth-century American removal law derive primarily from two
sources in English common law. The first is the law of municipal corporations, which governed the ability of towns and boroughs to remove officers
whose positions derived from the terms of their municipal charter.150 The
second is what we call the law of public officeholding,151 which governed
the removal of public officials, ranging from justices of the peace to
stewards of the manor,152 who held their office by virtue of appointment.
This second subset of cases often involved people appointed with good
behavior commissions—clerks, judges, stewards, and others whose offices

150. Nineteenth-century municipal law treatises sometimes note the different historical
origins of English municipalities incorporated by royal charter and those that “claim[ed]
their franchise[] by prescription” and later accepted charters of confirmation. J.W.
Willcock, The Law of Municipal Corporations; Together with a Brief Sketch of Their
History, and a Treatise on Mandamus and Quo Warranto 7–8 (London, William Benning
1827); see also 1 Frederick Pollack & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law
Before the Time of Edward I, at 520 (Cambridge, University Press 1895). For the purposes
of this Article, however, the distinction is not significant. Cf. R v. Corp. of Wells (1767) 98
Eng. Rep. 41, 44; 4. Burr. 1999, 2003 (KB) (noting, as one of several reasons that the
recorder did not breach his corporate duty, that the town of Wells was a corporation by
prescription and thus the meeting at which it elected its members of Parliament was not a
corporate meeting).
151. Professors Leib and Shugerman, writing about the connection between the phrase
“faithful execution” and fiduciary obligations in private law relationships, refer similarly to
“the law of public office.” Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary
Constitutionalism: Implications for Self-Pardons and Non-Delegation, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 463, 466 (2019).
152. See, e.g., R v. Steward of the Manor of Richmond (1839) 55 Rev. Rep. 829, 830; 3
Jurist 998, 999 (QB) (referring to a steward appointed quamdiu se bene gesserit); R v. Mayor
of London (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 96, 97; 2 T.R. 177, 179 (KB) (same).
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were, by the terms of a deed, commission, or controlling statute,153
quamdiu bene se gesserint (“so long as they well behave themselves”).154
By the end of the eighteenth century, case law in both contexts held
that “neglect of duty”155 and “malfeasance in office”156 were “misdemeanors”157 that breached the terms of office and could lead to removal.158
These cases made plain that both terms had specific meanings: “Neglect
of duty” meant failing to perform one’s duties in a way that caused specific
harm to the entity—town, court, or person—to which the duties were
owed, while “malfeasance” connoted the commission of an unlawful act in
the performance of one’s official duties. This section describes the evolution of the doctrine in these two areas of removal law to give a fuller sense
of both the terms’ meanings and the larger concerns involved.

153. A range of authority controlled the terms under which offices were held outside of
the municipal context, from Parliamentary statutes to charters from the King. See, e.g., 1
Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace, and Parish Officer 755 (London, T. Cadell;
Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, Green & Longman; J.G. & F. Rivington; Saunders & Benning
1836) (explaining that although most coroners are elected in their counties, “[c]oroners
by charter, or commission or privilege, were ordinarily made by grant or commission
without election”). See generally Birk, supra note 109 (undertaking a “comprehensive
investigation of whether the ability to remove and direct the activities of royal officers were
inherent features of the executive power as it was practiced and understood in England at
the time of the framing”).
154. An office appointed quamdiu or on good behavior was “in law a freehold for life.”
Thomas Tapping, The Law and Practice of the High Prerogative Writ of Mandamus, as It
Obtains Both in England, and in Ireland 223 (Phila., T. & J.W. Johnson 1853); see also
Harcourt v. Fox (Harcourt II) (1693) 89 Eng. Rep. 720, 734–38; 1 Show. K.B. 506, 534–36.
155. See, e.g., Respublica v. Meylin, 3 Yeates 1, 1, 4 (Pa. 1800) (discussing an “indictment for a misdemeanor” of county commissioners for “neglect of duty”); see also Page v.
Hardin, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 648, 664, 677 (1848) (examining “neglect of duty” as a
misdemeanor).
156. See Commonwealth v. Barry, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 229, 249 (1808) (considering an act of
“malfeasance” as a “misdemeanor”).
157. In this context, a misdemeanor was a “failure[] to demean oneself appropriately
in public office.” Kent et al., supra note 27, at 2170. Courts used the terms misdemeanor
and misbehavior interchangeably. See, e.g., Harcourt v. Fox (Harcourt I) (1692) 89 Eng.
Rep. 680, 684; 1 Show. K.B. 426, 433 (“The statute having impowered [sic] him who has the
right, to nominate one to hold it, for ‘so long . . . as he shall . . . demean himself in the office,’
goes on, and makes provision how he may be removed for a misbehaviour . . . having made
him removable only for misdemeanor . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also James Baker, An
Introduction to English Legal History 502 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the use of
misdemeanor to mean a civil, as opposed to a criminal, wrong); John Rastell, Les Termes
de la Ley 111 (1659) (outlining how misdemeanor or forfeiture of a deputy shall cause the
officer “whose deputy he is” to lose his office).
158. See, e.g., R v. Corp. of Wells (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 41, 42, 44; 4 Burr. 1999, 1999,
2003 (KB) (discussing an act as both a malfeasance and a breach of the relator’s corporate
duty, where he was both the town’s recorder and, by virtue of that position, a justice of the
peace, a quamdiu office); Ex p Parnell (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 439, 441; 1 Jac. & W. 450, 456
(Ch) (employing “neglect of duty” outside of the municipal corporation officeholding
context).
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a. Municipal Officer Removal. — At the start of the seventeenth
century, many towns, boroughs, and other municipalities exercised power
by virtue of a corporate charter—a grant from the Crown that gave the
corporation certain rights and powers.159 At common law, these municipal
corporations had little ability to remove their officers. Municipal offices
were part of an officer’s “freehold” or “freedom,” which derived from the
officer’s status as a member of the corporation.160 Municipal offices often
entitled their holders to an interest in the town’s lands and goods, or were
connected to their holders’ trade or living: They were, in short, valuable,
property-like positions.161 As Lord Coke explained in 1615’s Rex v.
Plymouth, commonly known as Bagg’s Case, a municipal corporation—
absent an express grant of removal power in its charter—could not remove
a municipal officer for anything short of a conviction in a court of law.162
This rule did not last. In 1728, King’s Bench163 announced in Lord
Bruce’s Case that an express grant of removal authority in the charter was
unnecessary, as “the modern opinion has been, that a power of
amotion”164—the removal of a corporate officer—“is incident to the
corporation, though Bag’s [sic] Case seems to the contrary.”165 Lord
Mansfield affirmed this shift, holding in 1758’s Rex v. Richardson that
where a corporate officer had violated his oath and the duties of his office,
and thus its “tacit condition,” the power to remove for cause was “incident
to every corporation,” as such a power was “necessary to the good order
and government of corporate bodies.”166
159. See Willcock, supra note 150, at 7–8.
160. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, bk. II, ch. 3, at
37 (George Sharswood ed., 1860) (discussing the corporate “franchise” or “liberty”).
161. See, e.g., R v. Ponsonby (1755) 30 Eng. Rep. 201, 201; 1 Ves. Jun. 1, 2 (KB); R v.
Mayor of Plymouth (Bagg’s Case) (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278; 11 Co. Rep. 93 b, 98 b
(KB).
162. Bagg’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep at 1279; 11 Co. Rep. at 99 a. The conviction, Coke explains,
could be either for an infamous crime such as perjury, forgery, or conspiracy, the taint of
which would render the officer unfit for any public office, or for an offense that involved
the violation of his corporate duty, such as defacing the borough charter. Id.
163. King’s Bench heard all cases involving the “misbehaviours” of corporations
because by law the King was, “in the strictest and original sense,” the founder of all
corporations and thus charged with ensuring that all corporations hewed to their
established ends. 1 Blackstone, supra note 160, bk. I, ch. 18, at 478–79.
164. The power to “amove” is the power to remove an officer, while the power to
disfranchise is the power to take away a corporator’s “freedom,” or franchise. In Bagg’s Case,
as subsequent commentators have noted, Coke used amotion and disfranchisement for the
most part interchangeably. See Willcock, supra note 150, at 245.
165. Lord Bruce’s Case (1728) 93 Eng. Rep. 870, 870; 2 Strange 819, 820 (KB).
166. R v. Richardson (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 426, 438; 1 Burr. 517, 538–39 (KB) (emphasis
omitted). By 1827, the transformation of corporate removal law from Bagg’s Case to Lord
Bruce’s Case to Richardson was a set piece of municipal law. In that year, Chancellor James
Kent included the trifecta in his Commentaries on American Law, relying on them to assert
that, in a corporation, “[t]he power of amotion, or removal of a member for a reasonable
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Another principle of municipal removal that solidified over the
course of the eighteenth century was that an officer could only rarely be
removed “without some act of ceremony.”167 An officer could not simply
be declared to have forfeited his office; instead, the corporation had to
exercise its “power of amotion” by granting the officer some sort of
process to determine whether his misdemeanor amounted to a “cause of
forfeiture.”168 The process granted was a “formal” one conducted by the
corporation itself, as the corporation was “the best judge[] of the nature
[of its] own constitution.”169 The person to be dispossessed had to be given
legal notice and “a proper opportunity of making a defence to the charge
upon which he is removed.”170 And where the corporation wished to
remove or “amove” an officer for a violation of duty that was also a crime
at common law, that amotion had to be preceded by a criminal trial.171
cause, is a power necessarily incident to every corporation.” 2 James Kent, Commentaries
on American Law 238 (N.Y., O. Halsted 1827). Kent was so certain that that the power was
incident to the corporation that he added “the power of amotion” as a sixth item to the
conventional list of a corporation’s five incident powers: to elect members, to sue and be
sued, to purchase and hold land and chattels, to have a common seal, and to make by-laws.
Id. at 224. It is worth noting, moreover, the closeness between Mansfield’s logic and that
employed thirty-one years later in “the Decision of 1789.” Both Mansfield and those who in
1789 desired to locate in the President an inherent removal power rooted their arguments
in the idea that because the power to remove officers was a power necessary to good
government, it must be incidental to the institution. For more on the intellectual parallels
between the development of an incidental municipal removal power and the growth of the
unitary executive theory, see Manners & Menand, supra note 22.
167. R v. Ponsonby (1755) 30 Eng. Rep. 201, 204; 1 Ves. Jun. 1, 6–7 (KB); see also Avery
v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160, 182 (1807) (stating that although many varieties
of misfeasance or nonfeasance might “cause a forfeiture of the office,” parishioners cannot
appoint a new minister without process, such as a legal meeting of the town at which the
parishioners “assign[] in their votes the causes of the forfeiture and of their dismission”);
cf. R v. Mayor of London (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 96, 98; 2 T.R. 177, 181–82 (KB) (explaining
that the suspension of an officer holding a quamdiu office without first summoning him to
answer to the charge was not improper in light of his “extremely reprehensible” conduct
and the fact that the suspension could still be rescinded); Lord Bruce’s Case, 93 Eng. Rep. at
870; 2 Strange at 819–20 (suggesting—although the context makes it unclear—that a
“forfeiture” results in immediate vacancy in office, while “misdemeanour” does not).
168. Ponsonby, 30 Eng. Rep, at 204; 1 Ves. Jun. at 7.
169. Id. at 204; 1 Ves. Jun. at 8 (citing Lord Holt).
170. Mayor of London, 100 Eng. Rep. at 98; 2 T.R. at 181 (quoting R v. Mayor of Liverpool
(1759) 97 Eng. Rep. 533, 539; 2 Burr. 723, 734 (KB)); see also R v. Bailiffs of Gippo (1705)
92 Eng. Rep. 313, 317; 2 Ld. Raym. 1232, 1240 (QB) (acknowledging that notice must be
given but may also be waived by the officer); City of Exeter v. Glide (1691) 90 Eng. Rep. 992,
992; 1 Holt K.B. 169, 170 (requiring notice of the particular charge). Professor James
Pfander notes that the members of the Constitutional Convention rejected removal of
judges by joint address of the legislature in favor of impeachment because the process that
inhered in impeachment “provided greater security for judicial tenure and ensured a trialtype proceeding at which the judge could mount a defense against claims of misbehavior.”
James E. Pfander, Removing Federal Judges, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1227, 1243 (2007).
171. The concern was that an amotion ought not prejudge. See Richardson, 97 Eng. Rep.
at 438; 1 Burr. at 538; see also R v. Mayor of London (Wooldridge’s Case) (1785) 99 Eng. Rep.
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Not every “misbehaviour” rose to the level of a forfeiture. Disruptive
words of contempt, for instance, were not a sufficient cause for removal,
even if they were against “the chief officer.”172 Nor was one instance of
knowingly neglecting to perform a corporate duty, at least where it had
not been shown that the failure had interfered with the business of the
corporation.173 If it were sufficient, Mansfield warned, “[t]here is not an
officer or freeman in the kingdom . . . that might not be removed or
disfranchised.”174 Bankruptcy was not enough;175 nor was a four-month
absence from office.176 For these and other instances of misbehavior that
did not rise to the level of removal, there were other remedies: One could,
as Lord Coke suggested in Bagg’s Case, demand that the officer find “good
sureties for his good behavior,”177 and sometimes, penalties for neglect
were assigned by statute.178
Removal, the case law shows, was a measure to be taken only when the
officer’s neglect threatened the municipality’s wellbeing. To meet this
standard, a pattern of willful neglect was enough,179 and both voluntary180
and involuntary181 nonattendance, where the circumstances (including
being imprisoned for debt) made future attendance unlikely, were also
enough. By the end of the eighteenth century, the mass of precedent held
that as a species of officer “misbehaviour,” neglect of duty only amounted
to a “cause of forfeiture” where an officer’s failure to do his job caused
meaningful harm to the public good.
The judges of King’s Bench emphasized that it was the municipality,
rather than a superior officer, to which the officer owed his duties. In Rex
v. Corporation of Wells, for example, Lord Mansfield rejected the argument
that an officer of the town of Wells had breached his duty by disobeying
the mayor’s order, explaining that the officer’s actions had not been illegal
922, 933; 4 Dougl. 360, 381 (KB); Bagg’s Case (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278; 11 Co. Rep.
93 b, 98 a (KB); Willcock, supra note 150, at 264–68 (describing the required procedures
for amotion).
172. Bagg’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1278; 11 Co. Rep. at 98 a–b.
173. Richardson, 97 Eng. Rep. at 439; 1 Burr. at 540–41; see also R v. Corp. of Wells
(1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 41, 46; 4 Burr. 1999, 2007 (KB); R v. Halford (1733) 27 Eng. Rep. 748,
748; 1 Ridg. T.H. 31, 32–33 (KB); cf. Bailiffs of Gippo, 92 Eng. Rep. at 316; 2 Ld. Raym. at
1237 (explaining that, in the case of a “public office concerning the administration of
justice, . . . non-attendance [at a sessions of the peace] is a cause of forfeiture” and pointing
out the “difference . . . between public and private offices” in this regard).
174. Richardson, 97 Eng. Rep. at 440; 1 Burr. at 541.
175. See Mayor of Liverpool, 97 Eng. Rep. at 538; 2 Burr. at 732.
176. See R v. Leicester (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 88, 89; 4 Burr. 2087, 2089 (KB).
177. Bagg’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1278; 11 Co. Rep. at 98 b.
178. See, e.g., Feltham v. Terry (1773) 98 Eng. Rep. 613, 613; 1 Lofft 207, 207 (KB)
(stating that a churchwarden was convicted under a statute for neglect of duty).
179. R v. Bailiffs of Ipswich (1708) 91 Eng. Rep. 378, 378; 2 Salk. 434, 435 (KB).
180. See City of Exeter v. Glide (1691) 90 Eng. Rep. 992, 992; 1 Holt K.B. 169, 169–70.
181. See Wooldridge’s Case (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 922, 933; 4 Dougl. 360, 382–83 (KB).
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and had been motivated by “a sincere opinion.”182 It did not matter that
he had offered advice that went against the mayor’s admonition or that it
had turned out to be bad advice. “He g[ave] his opinion,” Mansfield
explained, and “his opinion was wrong. They who were his friends, suffer
by it. This is no breach of his corporate duty.”183 Mansfield’s holding was
unambiguous: The officer’s duty was to the town, not the mayor, and could
not be violated by an exercise of discretion, no matter how erroneous.
Thus, by the Founding Era, we can identify four principles of officer
removal in the municipal law context: first, that a municipal corporation
had the inherent power to amove an officer for violating his official duties;
second, that removing a municipal officer required notice and an
opportunity to be heard; third, that to be a cause of “forfeiture,” a
municipal officer’s “neglect of duty” had to cause harm to the municipal
welfare; and fourth, that a corporate officer’s duties were owed not to any
superior but to the corporation itself.184
b. Public Officer Removal. — Where the evolution of municipal law
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made it easier to remove
corporate officers, the law of noncorporate public officeholding moved in
the opposite direction over the same period, gradually limiting an
appointer’s ability to remove an officer. In this second subset of the
English common law of removal, the absence of a municipal charter meant
that the baseline was different: If the grant of office or the controlling
statute imposed no limits, an appointer could appoint a replacement
officer at any time.185 (This, perhaps, is the origin of the oft-asserted
dictum that the power to remove an officer is “an incident” of the power
to appoint; where an appointer can remove an incumbent officer simply
by appointing a replacement, no separate removal authority is
necessary.186) Where the statute or grant did impose limits, however,
182. (1767) 98 Eng. Rep. 41, 44; 4 Burr. 1999, 2003 (KB).
183. Id. at 44; 4 Burr. at 2004.
184. For a late-nineteenth-century American treatise that reaches many of the same
conclusions, see Dillon, supra note 145, at 222–29.
185. This is not to underplay the range of tenures that did exist. See supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 189–211; see also Stadler v. City of Detroit, 13 Mich. 346, 348–49
(1865) (“It has been held that where an officer is appointed during the pleasure of the
appointing power, an appointment of another person is a removal of the incumbent.”); cf.
Avery v. Inhabitants of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 160, 179–82 (1807) (acknowledging that the
power to appoint at pleasure entails the power to remove but holding that in the instant
case custom made the office in question a life appointment, removable only for
misbehavior). Whether the Framers of the U.S. Constitution subscribed to this
understanding is a topic of some debate. Professor Saikrishna Prakash has argued that they
did not. Prakash, Removal and Tenure, supra note 136, at 1834. But Prakash’s argument
that the Constitution rejects what he labels the “symmetry” rule rests on flawed logic.
Because the Electoral College cannot recall the President or the Vice President and the
electors of members of Congress cannot remove their delegates, he argues, the Framers
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courts increasingly interpreted them as meaningful constraints on the
appointer’s removal power,187 such that by the late-eighteenth century, the
limits on officer removal that had emerged in the municipal officer
context applied with equal force to cases involving the removal of officers
outside of the corporate setting.188
evidently rejected the idea that appointment and removal powers were aligned. This
reasoning misses the crucial point that the President, the Vice President, Senators, and
Representatives all hold offices established for a term of years and thus are not removable
(outside of impeachment) absent a provision to the contrary. See infra section II.B.2. The
lawyer for the relator in 1839’s Ex parte Hennen made a similar argument, which the Court
did not adopt. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839) (rejecting the relator’s argument and
holding that “[i]n the absence of all constitutional provision, or statutory regulation, it
would seem to be a sound and necessary rule, to consider the power of removal as incident
to the power of appointment”). Compare Prakash, Removal and Tenure, supra note 136, at
1834 (arguing the symmetry rule does not apply to the U.S. Constitution because “[t]he
Electoral College has no authority to oust presidents and vice presidents[,] the people of a
congressional district may not recall their Representative[,] [and] state assemblies [do not]
have the power to dismiss Senators”), with Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 235 (presenting the
relator’s argument that “the debate in 1789” had rejected the symmetry rule for federal
officeholding because presidential electors cannot remove the President or Vice President,
state legislatures cannot revoke Senate appointments, and “members of the House of
Representatives, when once elected, are independent of those whom they represent”). It is,
in other words, possible and even likely that the Framers embraced the symmetry rule for
non-term-of-years offices. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons that the decision to
permit the President alone to remove officers who had been appointed by both the
President and the Senate was controversial. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 455–79 (1789)
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834); William H. Rogers, The Executive Power of Removal 14
(Washington, G.S. Gideon 1856).
187. See generally Birk, supra note 109 (describing instances in which Parliament instituted protections against removal). Among other limits, notice and process were generally
required. See, e.g., Harcourt I (1692) 89 Eng. Rep. 680, 685; 1 Show. K.B. 426, 434 (stating
that a statute making the clerk of the peace removable only on misbehavior requires “that
an accusation shall be put against him in writing, and this to be done in open sessions before
the justices, where it shall be examined into and proved”); cf. Ex p Parnell (1820) 37 Eng.
Rep. 439, 441; 1 Jac. & W. 451, 456 (Ch) (Eldon, L.C.) (addressing a county coroner
removed from office who did not receive the removal writ because he was imprisoned for
debt in another county and finding removal nonetheless appropriate because the coroner’s
prolonged neglect of his duties made it “the duty of the great seal to remove him”); 1 Sir
Edward Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 175 (London, W.
Clarke & Sons 1817) (explaining a thirteenth-century instance of removal, via Lord
Chancellor’s writ issued upon petition by the county sheriff, of a county coroner who was
elected for life and was unable to pay a fine for a false return). The process varied according
to the public or private nature of the office, in addition to the terms of the grant. See, e.g.,
R v. Mayor of London (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 96, 96–98; 2 T.R. 177, 179–81 (KB) (analogizing
an officer’s case to those of corporate officers who require “nothing short of legal notice,”
even though the officer did not possess a “corporate office” but rather a “private appointment by the corporation”). See generally Tapping, supra note 154, at 221–53 (describing
various factors courts considered in deciding whether to grant or deny writs of mandamus
for office).
188. See, e.g., R v. Barker (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 823–24; 3 Burr. 1265, 1266 (KB)
(Mansfield, C.J.) (granting a writ of mandamus to admit a displaced preacher—a
noncorporate office—where the preacher possessed “a right to execute an office, perform
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One case of nonmunicipal removal from this period, Harcourt v. Fox,
helpfully illuminates the logic behind the shift towards tighter constraints.
In 1689, Simon Harcourt II was appointed the clerk of the peace of
Middlesex County.189 The office involved both clerical and legal duties for
the Middlesex justices of the peace and enabled Harcourt to earn
generous fees.190 Under a recent Parliamentary statute, the office was to
last “so long as [its holder] did well behave himself in it,” which was widely
understood to make the role a life appointment.191 Harcourt was chosen
by the Earl of Clare,192 who had himself only recently been appointed custos
rotulorum193 of Middlesex, the officer entitled to appoint the clerk.194
Two years later, the Earl of Clare was replaced by the Earl of
Bedford;195 a year after that, the Earl of Bedford appointed his own
steward, John Fox, to take Harcourt’s place.196 Harcourt challenged the
appointment by suing Fox for the money he had received.197 A special
verdict found that Harcourt was “capable and sufficient,” that he had
taken the required oath of office, and that he had indeed “well behave[d]
a service, or exercise a franchise”); R v. Blooer (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 697, 697–98; 2 Burr.
1043, 1043–45 (KB) (Mansfield, C.J.) (explaining that mandamus will issue “where a person
is wrongfully dispossessed of any office or function which draws after it temporal rights”).
That this doctrinal transformation appears to be almost entirely the work of Lord Mansfield
is in keeping with previous treatments of Mansfield’s revolutionary tenure on the bench.
See generally James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield (2004)
(describing Lord Mansfield’s jurisprudence in various areas of English common law). On
the question of the circumstances under which a writ of mandamus will issue and the writ’s
jurisdictional implications, see supra notes 138–148 and accompanying text.
189. Harcourt II (1693) 89 Eng. Rep. 720, 730; 1 Show. K.B. 506, 527; Stuart Handley,
Harcourt, Simon II (1653–1724), of the Middle Temple and Pendley, Herts., The Hist. of
Parliament: Brit. Pol., Soc. & Loc. Hist. (2002), https://www.historyofparliament
online.org/volume/1690-1715/member/harcourt-simon-ii-1653-1724 [https://perma.cc/
VR73-QSHJ].
190. Middlesex Sessions of the Peace: Clerk of the Peace, Archives in London & the
M25 Area, https://aim25.com/cgi-bin/vcdf/detail?coll_id=14580&inst_id=118&nv1=brow
se&nv2=repos [https://perma.cc/Q6KA-GUYT] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
191. Harcourt II, 89 Eng. Rep. at 730; 1 Show. K.B. at 527.
192. Coming just one year after the Glorious Revolution, Harcourt’s appointment had
probably not been a sure thing: He had reportedly served as a clerk to the Lord Chief Justice
during the so-called Bloody Assizes of the previous monarch, James II, in addition to other
Crown service not likely to endear him to the Whig supporters of the new King and Queen.
See Handley, supra note 189.
193. Merriam-Webster defines custos rotulorum as “the principal justice of the peace in
an English county who is also keeper of the rolls and records of the sessions of the peace.”
Custos Rotulorum, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cus
tos%20rotulorum [https://perma.cc/AS3N-ETAF] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
194. See Harcourt II, 89 Eng. Rep. at 720; 1 Show. K.B. at 507; Handley, supra note 189.
195. Harcourt I (1692) 89 Eng. Rep. 680, 681; 1 Show. K.B. 426, 427. The Earl of
Bedford’s son had been executed for opposing James II’s accession many years earlier.
Handley, supra note 189.
196. Harcourt I, 89 Eng. Rep. at 681; 1 Show. K.B. at 427.
197. Id. at 681; 1 Show. K.B. at 426.
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himself” in the job.198 The remaining legal question, as Chief Justice Holt
put it, was whether a newly appointed custos rotulorum for Middlesex
County could remove the county’s clerk, who had been appointed on good
behavior, simply because he wished to.199
No, Holt explained, he could not. There were certainly good reasons
to allow a justice to appoint his own clerk, since the justice would be the
one dishonored by any mistakes the clerk might make, and the justice
would also know best who “is most fit and proper” to do the job.200 But
Parliament quite clearly had other objectives in mind when it rewrote the
law. Initially, Holt explained, the standard rule had applied: Only the custos
could remove the clerk “because he put him in.”201 But two statutory
revisions had changed that. The first had specified that the clerk “shall be
clerk so long as the custos remains in his office, if he behaved himself
well.”202 The second stated simply that the clerk “shall hold the office for
so long time only as he shall behave himself well in it”—without providing,
as Holt pointedly noted, “if so be the custos remain custos.”203 These
changes, together with the fact that the second revision newly empowered
the justices as a whole to remove the clerk “for misdemeanor,”204 could
not have been accidental. “The design of the makers of this [second] Act
was,” Holt reasoned, “to take off much of that dependance which the clerk
before had upon the custos, and to make him more dependant on the
justices of the peace.”205 The upshot was that the clerk’s office had gone
from an at-pleasure appointment to a good-behavior appointment
dependent on the custos to a good-behavior appointment independent of
the custos: in other words, “an estate for life.”206 By making the clerk’s
tenure independent of his appointer, Parliament had severed the
relationship between the two. Holt knew why: to “encourage [the clerk]
in the faithful execution of [his] office” by “put[ting] him out of fear of
losing [his estate] for any thing but his own misbehavior in it.”207 “[I]t
seems,” Holt concluded, that Parliament had designed the structure to

198. Id. at 681; 1 Show. K.B. at 427.
199. Id. at 681–82; 1 Show. K.B. at 428.
200. Harcourt II (1693) 89 Eng. Rep. 720, 732; 1 Show. K.B. 506, 531.
201. Id. at 733; 1 Show. K.B. at 534.
202. Id. at 733; 1 Show. K.B. at 532 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 37
Hen. 8, c. 1).
203. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 37 Hen. 8, c. 1).
204. Id. at 728; 1 Show. K.B. at 523. Chief Justice Holt uses “misdemeanor” and
“misbehaviour” as cognates throughout his opinion. See, e.g., id. at 722; 1 Show. K.B. at 510
(“[H]e shall [not] be removable by the custos . . . but for misbehaviour . . . . I conceive they
will find it as hard to make out any such inference from the intention of this Act . . . that he
shall be removable any ways but misdemeanor.”).
205. Id. at 733; 1 Show. K.B. at 533.
206. Id. at 734; 1 Show. K.B. at 535–36.
207. Id. at 734; 1 Show K.B. at 534.
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advance “the public good . . . for it was a great mischief to have the office
so easily vacable.”208
Holt’s opinion in Harcourt was regularly cited during the nineteenth
century, in America as well as England, as establishing legislative authority
to limit an appointer’s removal power for the “public good.”209 The
common law rule for removal had been that an appointer could remove
an appointee absent statutory, customary, or constitutional limitations.210
Harcourt established beyond any doubt that legislatures could curtail that
power. Where the legislature provided an officeholder with some form of
tenure protection—either on good behavior or for a term of years—it was
exclusively the legislature’s choice whether to also permit the appointer to
remove such an official and, if so, on what grounds.
The case also illuminates the structural stakes of such disputes.
Should powerful patrons—such as modern Presidents—be able to replace
an officer whom they politically disfavor, solely based on that
disagreement? What are the costs of limiting an appointer’s discretion
when the appointer knows best “who is most fit and proper” to do the work
and when the appointer will suffer the “dishonour” if the appointee does
poor work?211 By making the position removable only on misbehavior, and
by making all of the justices of the peace the judges of that misbehavior,
Parliament struck a balance between job security on the one hand and
effective service on the other. The goal, as with the emerging principles of
officer removal in the municipal context, was to engineer a mix of
incentives to ensure “faithful execution.”212 The techniques used in both
settings aimed to advance the public good by protecting officers from
political meddling while establishing procedures to remove officers whose
actions—or failures to act—imperiled the common welfare. The
principles and standards undergirding these efforts would echo powerfully
throughout centuries of transatlantic legal practice, as jurists and
lawmakers drew on the lessons of their English forebears to hold public
officers to account.
2. Neglect of Duty, Malfeasance in Office, and Faithful Execution. — This
section shows how early American legislatures, courts, and constitutional
drafters used the terms “neglect of duty” and “malfeasance in office” to
articulate the meaning of an officer’s “faithful execution” and employed
a range of statutory tools to strike a balance between tenure security and
oversight. Section II.B.2.a examines the range of tools employed in
colonial statutes to hold officers accountable, together with the
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 236–37 (1839); R v. Hayward
(1862) 121 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1193; 2 B. &. S. 585, 592 (QB).
210. Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 247.
211. Harcourt II (1689) 89 Eng. Rep. at 732; 1 Show. K.B. at 531.
212. Id. at 734; 1 Show. K.B. at 534.
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restrictions these early documents placed on the executive’s authority to
remove public officers, particularly those involved with public finance.
Section II.B.2.b, meanwhile, addresses the use of “neglect” and “malfeasance” in nineteenth-century state statutes, showing the terms’ continued
use in efforts to motivate officers’ “faithful execution.”
a. Colonial Statutes. — England’s North American colonies began
experimenting with ways to ensure officers’ faithful execution of their
duties long before the Founding Era.213 Among the several tools colonies
used to hold officers accountable were terms of years, which facilitated
rotation in office, regular elections,214 and the authorization of private
suits against public officers for neglect.215 According to the historian Carl
Russell Fish, rotation in office was a favorite tool in the colonies, intended
“to educate the people and equalize the burdens of officeholding” by

213. Officers who handled their neighbors’ money, affected their livelihoods, or
exercised control over the personal liberty of others—sheriffs, constables, handlers of
precious commodities, members of slave patrols—received particular focus, and statutes
governing these positions employed a mix of carrots and sticks to encourage faithful
execution. In South Carolina, for instance, a 1736 law establishing “constant Patrols . . . for
the better preventing any future Insurrections or Cabals of . . . Slaves” authorized the militia
captains in charge to assess penalties for “Breach or Neglect of Duty” on any person who
refused to do their month’s service. An Act for the Better Establishing and Regulating of
Patrols, reprinted in Acts Passed by the General Assembly of South-Carolina 29, 29–35
(Charles Town, Lewis Timothi 1736).
214. Elections were particularly prevalent where the official in question was in charge
of critical colonial commodities or other property. In colonial New York, for instance, any
town that produced “caskes” (containers) “for any Liquors[,] fish, Beefe, Porke or other
Commodities to be put to Sale” was to “yearely make Choice of a fitt man” to serve as a
“gager” or “packer,” a critical role in a colony intended to generate wealth for the Crown
from the sale of such goods. 1 The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the
Revolution, Including the Charters to the Duke of Work, the Commissions and Instructions
to Colonial Governors, the Duke’s Laws, the Laws of the Dongan and Leisler Assemblies,
the Charters of Albany and New York and the Acts of the Colonial Legislatures from 1691
to 1775 Inclusive 58–59 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1894) [hereinafter Colonial Laws of New
York]. The elected officer was then to be approved by the constable before taking his oath
before the justices of the peace. Id. If he refused to take his oath, both he and the constable
or town were to pay a fine, and another “gager” or “packer” was to be chosen in his place.
And if, in the performance of his duties, he failed to “see that all Caske he Packs . . . bee . . .
true and full,” he would be assessed ten shillings for every defective cask packed, half of
which would go to the governor and half to the person who had informed on the packer.
Id.
215. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 26, 1772, reprinted in 5 Laws of the Royal Colony of New
Jersey, 1770–1775, at 145, 145–47 (Bernard Bush ed., 1986) (noting that land clearance
commissioners were to serve a term of years, that they were suable and removable by
assembly for neglect, and that damages were to be applied to the clearance project); 1
Colonial Laws of New York, supra note 214, at 13, 59–65 (encouraging fines of sheriffs and
constables by moiety). A moiety was a common way to incentivize private action against
public officers, similar to today’s qui tam statutes. Successful plaintiffs would receive half of
the monetary award. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary
Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, at 26–29 (2013).
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ensuring a taking of turns.216 Massachusetts’s Elbridge Gerry described
terms of years as a solution to “the overbearing insolence of office.”217 As
Gerry put it, rotation “keeps the minds of man in equilibrio, and teaches
him the feelings of the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his
turn.”218 The range and ingenuity of these pre-revolutionary statutes testify
to the importance that lawmakers attached to officer accountability. Early
state constitutions, replete with positions held for terms of years or on
good behavior, reveal a similar focus.219
b. State Statutes. — After the Revolution, Americans continued to
experiment with statutory solutions to the puzzle of faithful execution.
One primary way in which early legislators encouraged officers’ good
behavior was through laws requiring officers to swear an oath and post a
bond conditioned on the “faithful execution” of the duties of their
office.220 As Professors Andrew Kent, Ethan Lieb, and Jed Shugerman have
216. Fish, supra note 132, at 80.
217. Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elbridge Gerry). To protect
the independence of public offices, several constitutions underscored the importance of
such offices having “an honorable stated salary, of a fixed and permanent value, amply
sufficient for those purposes, and established by standing laws.” Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. II,
§ 1, arts. 1, 2, 13 (speaking of annually elected governor); see also Pa. Const. of 1776, § 23
(establishing that supreme court judges have fixed salaries and seven-year commissions
only). Professor Pfander argues that Article III’s “presumption in favor of salary-based
compensation” for federal judges, rather than the then-common system of fee-based
compensation, was an effort both to “ward off corruption” and to discourage the expansion
of federal jurisdiction through the use of legal fictions. See James E. Pfander, Judicial
Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
1, 4 (2008).
218. Fish, supra note 132, at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Elbridge
Gerry).
219. Scholars have long commented on the relative weakness of the executive in early
state models. See, e.g., Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–
1787, at 143–50 (1969) (highlighting the connection Revolutionary-era thinkers drew
between executive tyranny and the power of appointment); Miriam Seifter, Gubernatorial
Administration, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 493–95 (2017). Professor Peter Shane focuses on how
little removal authority early state constitutions gave their chief executive officers,
describing the fractured nature of gubernatorial control. Peter M. Shane, The Originalist
Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 323, 338–44 (2016). It is striking that,
at a moment of such legislative ingenuity in the area of officer accountability, unfettered
executive removal authority is absent from the list of solutions these early state constitutions
employed. Such an omission is strong evidence that, at the time of the Founding, executive
removal authority was seen neither as essential to good governance nor as an inherent aspect
of executive power.
220. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 12, 1784, ch. 44, § 1, reprinted in 1 The General Laws of
Massachusetts, from the Adoption of the Constitution, to February, 1822 with the
Constitutions of the United States and of this Commonwealth, Together with Their
Respective Amendments, Prefixed 129, 129 (Theron Metcalf ed., Bos., Wells & Lilly,
Cummings & Hilliard 1823) (requiring every sheriff to give sufficient security for the faithful
performance of the duties of his office and to answer for the malfeasance and misfeasance
of all his deputies); see also Act of July 14, 1699, ch. 9, § 1, reprinted in 1 The Acts and
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recently shown, such obligations were “part of an anticorruption strategy”
that had existed for centuries and spanned both sides of the Atlantic.221
Usually, the bond would be made out to a state official, often the treasurer,
to be used to indemnify those injured by the officer’s breach.222 As courts
adjudicated the suits filed on these bonds, they used the concepts “neglect

Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay: To Which Are
Prefixed the Charters of the Province with Historical and Explanatory Notes, and an
Appendix 381, 381 (Bos., Wright & Potter 1869) (requiring the sheriff to give security “unto
the king’s majesty” at the discretion of the sessions for the due and faithful discharge of his
office).
221. Kent et al., supra note 27, at 2151 n.231. In England, for instance, a sheriff had to
answer for the escape of people held in a county jail and thus had to possess “sufficient lands
within the county” to cover the expense. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 160, bk. I, ch. 9, at
346 & n.18.
222. See, e.g., Skinner v. Phillips, 4 Mass. 68, 73–74 (1808) (“[W]here the
commonwealth has received no injury . . . the damages are to be recovered . . . for the
use . . . of those who have suffered them and . . . the state treasurer is a mere trustee of the
bond for the use of those who may suffer a breach of its condition . . . .”).
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of duty”223 and “malfeasance in office”224 to liquidate the meaning of faithful execution,225 along with “misfeasance,”226 “nonfeasance,”227 “misconduct,”228 and “non-user.”229 Did a coroner breach his bond of faithful
performance by seizing a wagon that he erroneously believed to belong to
a debtor against whom he was to execute a writ?230 Had a constable
223. People ex rel. Kellogg v. Schuyler, 4 N.Y. 173, 180 (1850) (“Where the duty exists,
and it is neglected, or performed in an improper manner, the sureties upon the principle
should be liable, otherwise not.”); id. at 192 (“There is clearly a duty resting upon the
sheriff, not only to return the writ but to return it truly. If he should fail to do so, it would
most clearly be a violation of official duty.”); People v. Spraker, 18 Johns. 390, 396 (N.Y.
1820) (examining whether a sheriff’s alleged neglect of duty by failing to execute a writ
must be “judicially ascertained”).
224. Harris v. Hanson, 11 Me. 241, 245–46 (1834) (holding that “[i]t is malfeasance [in
office], if the officer under color of his office does what the law prohibits” and that
“[m]alfeasance in office is . . . a breach of the condition for faithful performance”); Skinner,
4 Mass. at 73 (concluding that malfeasance in office violates the defendant’s oath to
“faithfully execute all the duties of his office” and that “the condition of the bond is broken
by the malfeasance of the sheriff in his office”); 2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, Adapted
to the Constitution and Laws of the United States 90 (Phila., T & J.W. Johnson 1839)
[hereinafter Bouvier, 1839 ed.] (defining “malfeasance” as “the unjust performance of
some act which the party had no right, or which he had contracted not to do”).
225. Justice Kagan implies such a correspondence in her recent dissent in Seila Law,
writing that INM would allow the President to remove the CFPB Director for “a failure to
‘faithfully execute[]’ the law, as well as for basic incompetence.” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2238 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with
respect to severability and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3).
226. Misfeasance is a distinct concept from malfeasance. See supra note 224. Rather
than an “unjust performance of some act which the party had no right . . . to do,” a
misfeasance is “the performance of an act which might lawfully be done, in an improper
manner, by which another person receives an injury.” Bouvier, 1839 ed., supra note 224, at
135 (emphasis added). Misconduct, see infra note 228, often encompasses both misfeasance
and malfeasance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barry, 3 Ky. 229, 246–47 (1808) (describing
instances of misfeasance and malfeasance as misconduct).
227. “[T]he non performance of some act which ought to be performed.” Bouvier, 1839
ed., supra note 224, at 186. Nonfeasance is distinct from misfeasance and malfeasance. See
supra note 226; see also Earl of Shrewsbury’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 798, 805; 9 Co. Rep.
46 a, 50 b (KB).
228. “Unlawful behavior by a person intrusted [sic] in any degree with the
administration of justice, by which the rights of the parties and the justice of the case may
have been affected.” 2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and
Laws of the United States 240 (15th ed. 1885) [hereinafter Bouvier, 1885 ed.]. Misconduct
does not appear in the 1839 edition.
229. “[T]he neglect to make use of a thing . . . Every public officer is required to use his
office for the public good; a non-user of a public office is therefore a sufficient cause of
forfeiture.” Bouvier, 1839 ed., supra note 224, at 186 (citing 1 Blackstone, supra note 160,
bk. II, ch. 10, at 153); see also People ex rel. Kellogg v. Schuyler, 4 N.Y. 173, 179 (1850) (“If
he had neglected to act without some legal excuse, it would have been a nonfeasance; if he
had acted wrongfully in attempting to obey the mandate, it would have been a
misfeasance . . . .”).
230. See Harris v. Hanson, 11 Me. 241, 245–46 (1834) (holding that the defendant’s act
constituted malfeasance in office and thus breached the condition of his bond); Kellogg, 4
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breached his official duty by seizing property whose value exceeded the
maximum he was permitted to seize under the statute?231 In determining
whether an officeholder who had engaged in such “misbehavior”232 had
breached the condition of his bond, judges engaged in the ongoing,
mutually constitutive process by which courts and legislatures gave shape
and color to the meaning of an officer’s faithful execution.
In addition to making officers accountable to those wronged by their
failure to faithfully execute their duties, legislatures encouraged faithful
execution in several other ways. Pennsylvania made officers of various
tenures liable for fines or forfeiture for “neglect of duty.”233 Sheriffs,
justices of the peace, burgesses, appraisers, overseers of the poor, officers
in the militia, constables, coroners, and supervisors of the public roads
were also liable for monetary penalties for “neglecting” or “refusing” to
execute their offices.234 Some officials, like the clerk of the market, could
be removed for “malfeazance,”235 while others could not be removed short
of impeachment,236 so that personal liability for neglect and misconduct
existed as a separate deterrent and remedy. New York employed a similar
mechanism for firemen,237 inspectors of beef and pork,238 highway
supervisors,239 surveyors,240 and public auctioneers,241 who were either
made subject to specific fines and penalties for neglect or “fraud” (in the
case of inspectors of beef and pork) or made liable to suit by the
government. Virginia, too, imposed monetary forfeiture on officials—like

N.Y. at 173 (finding that a sheriff who seized the wrong person’s goods had committed
official misconduct in breach of his bond); see also Lammon v. Feusier, 111 U.S. 17, 21
(1884) (citing cases affirming the liability of the sureties of an officer).
231. See City of Lowell v. Parker, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 309, 313 (1845).
232. “Improper or unlawful conduct.” Bouvier, 1885 ed., supra note 228, at 239.
Misbehavior does not appear in the 1839 edition.
233. Act of June 21, 1781, ch. 945, § 7, 1781 Pa. Laws 337, 342.
234. See Act of Apr. 10, 1807, ch. 132, § 17, 1807 Pa. Laws 259, 265 (justices of the
peace); Act of Mar. 27, 1784, ch. 134, § 7, 1784 Pa. Laws 188, 190 (appraisers); Act of Sept.
12, 1783, ch. 76, §§ 10, 27, 1783 Pa. Laws 124, 128, 134 (burgesses, constables, and
supervisors of the highways); Act of Mar. 21, 1783, ch. 67, §§ 10, 16, 1783 Pa. Laws 105, 108,
110 (officers in the militia); Act of Mar. 16, 1779, ch. 828, § 1, 1779 Pa. Laws 320, 320–21
(sheriffs, coroners, constables, overseers of the poor, and supervisors of the highway).
235. See Act of Apr. 13, 1782, ch. 14, § 9, 1782 Pa. Laws 25, 29.
236. See Pa. Const. of 1776, § 22.
237. Act of Mar. 26, 1803, ch. 58, § 4, 1803 N.Y. Laws 242, 243.
238. Act of Apr. 9, 1804, ch. 98, § 11, 1804 N.Y. Laws 630, 633.
239. See Act of Feb. 22, 1803, ch. 14, § 3, 1803 N.Y. Laws 325, 326 (stating that if the
superintendents of highways “refuse or neglect to account with the supervisors . . . then it
shall be the duty of the said supervisors” to notify the treasurer to prosecute the
superintendents “by an action of debt”).
240. Act of Mar. 9, 1790, ch. 22, § 11, 1790 N.Y. Laws 299, 304.
241. Act of Feb. 20, 1784, ch. 4, § 3, 1784 N.Y. Laws 590, 592.
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sheriffs,242 justices of the peace,243 and “[i]nspectors of fish”244—who
neglected or refused to perform their duties.
States also regularly separated the power to remove from the power
to appoint, and they continued to use the three tenures that James
Madison had identified as central to republican officeholding: “at
pleasure,” “good behavior,” and “for a limited period,” otherwise known
as a term of years.245 Some states, such as Virginia, began to specify removal
grounds with a particularity that went beyond “good behavior.” Starting in
1796, Virginia passed a series of statutes regulating the inspection of
economically vital tobacco warehouses. These laws provided that the
courts should annually appoint commissioners “of capacity and integrity”
to oversee the court-appointed inspectors of the state’s tobacco
warehouses.246 The commissioners were to report to the governor “any
negligence or breach of . . . duty . . . if it be of such a nature as to remove
such inspector from office” while certifying “such neglect or breach of
duty” to the court so that the court might “proceed against him according
to law.”247 A little over four years later, Virginia amplified its oversight
regime, requiring that the warehouses’ superintendents “be subject to the
same remedies, penalties, forfeitures and incapacities that inspectors of
tobacco are by law liable to for the misfeasance, non feasance and
malfeasance in office.”248
In 1828, the commissioners appointed to revise New York’s statutes249
proposed amending the state’s laws governing its prisons to provide that
the prisons’ agents and clerks “be nominated by the governor, and
appointed with the consent of the Senate” to “hold their offices for four
years,” but that they be removable “by the inspectors of their respective
prisons, for misconduct or neglect of duty.”250 Under the current law, the
242. Act of Dec. 10, 1793, ch. 9, § 2, 1793 Va. Acts 21, 21.
243. Act of Dec. 24, 1792, ch. 120, § 6, 1792 Va. Acts 233, 234.
244. A Table of Fines, Forfeitures, Penalties and Amercements, in 2 Collection of All
Such Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of a Public and Permanent Nature as Have
Passed Since the Session of 1801, at 213, 218 (Samuel Pleasants, Jr. ed., 1808) (“Inspectors
of fish neglecting their duty in attending to inspect, or stamping any barrel contrary to the
directions of the act, forfeit for each neglect of duty, and for each barrel of fish not duly
qualified, one dollar—To the informer.”).
245. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
246. Act of Dec. 26, 1796, ch. 12, § 1, 1796 Va. Acts 12, 12.
247. Id.
248. Act of Jan. 2, 1801, ch. 23, § 4, 1801 Va. Acts 14, 15.
249. The legislature had appointed Benjamin Butler, John Spencer, and John Duer as
commissioners to revise the state’s statutes. Butler and Spencer proposed the revisions here
in the fourth part of the commissioners’ report and included explanatory notes to the
legislature throughout the text of the report. B.F. Butler & J.C. Spencer, Report of the
Commissioners Appointed to Revise the Statute Laws of This State, pt. 4 (Albany, Croswell
& Van Benthuysen 1828).
250. Butler & Spencer, supra note 249, ch. 3, tit. 2, art. 1, § 14, at 15.
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commissioners explained, the prisons’ inspectors appointed their own
clerks; switching their appointment to the governor and Senate was
intended to “secure their independence,” a change that was deemed
“particularly important” when it came to the clerks (who were,
presumably, the prisons’ bookkeepers).251 Yet the commissioners did not
wish to sever the relationship between the clerk and the inspector entirely:
“[I]t is obvious,” they explained, “that the inspectors should have power
to remove for misconduct or neglect of duty.”252 The commissioners’ logic
is a striking echo of that which lay behind Parliament’s revisions to the
tenure of the county clerk at issue in Harcourt.253 By separating the power
of removal from the power of appointment, the commissioners hoped to
make the inspector and the clerk checks on each other, aligning their
accountability in a way that would maximize oversight and minimize
opportunities for corruption.
As the states began to commission officials to oversee more complex
infrastructural projects like schools, prisons, railroads, and canals, they
also incorporated the terms “neglect of duty” and “malfeasance in office”
into statutes as grounds for removing officials otherwise tenured for a term
of years.254 Statutes with these removal grounds were the subject of suit in
state courts, and a body of law interpreting the terms developed.255 By the
time Congress incorporated INM into the U.S. Code in 1887, there was

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See supra notes 189–210 and accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., Safety Fund Act, ch. 91, § 23, 1829 N.Y. Laws 167, 171 (providing that the
governor might remove the state’s three banking commissioners prior to the end of their
terms for “misconduct or neglect of duty”).
255. See, e.g., Page v. Hardin, 47 Ky. (8 B. Mon.) 648, 672–77 (1848) (examining
whether the governor can remove the Secretary of State for neglect of duty as a violation of
the term of office “during good behavior” and concluding that the “Secretary is not
removeable either at the pleasure of the Governor, or on his judgment for a misdemeanor . . . in office”); Commonwealth ex rel. Bowman v. Slifer, 25 Pa. 23, 28 (1855)
(concluding that the “omission to give bond” is “not a neglect of official duty for which the
governor is authorized to remove an incumbent duly commissioned for a term of years”).
Professor Miriam Seifter has characterized state courts’ treatment of agency independence
as differing markedly from that of their federal counterparts, in that state courts largely
embrace “ordinary interpretation” of “directly relevant statutes and constitutional clauses”
and eschew the federal courts’ “abstract, categorical approach.” Miriam Seifter,
Understanding State Agency Independence, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 1537, 1544 (2019) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 1941 (2011)). This approach, Professor Seifter
argues, accords with the “judicial[ly] modest[]” approach to agency independence that
many scholars have advocated at the federal level. Id. The cases cited herein largely support
this characterization, rendering their interpretation of state law removal provisions
particularly useful guides to the meanings of the terms that Congress ultimately codified in
1887. See id.
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nothing novel about the concepts of either neglect of duty or malfeasance
in office.256
3. Inefficiency and the Spoils System. — In addition to tackling the
longstanding problems of neglect of duty and malfeasance in office, legislators over the course of the nineteenth century developed novel methods
to encourage competent, methodical execution of the laws. Seeking to
prevent ineffective and wasteful administration, these legislators introduced a new term to the removal lexicon, “inefficiency,” completing the
INM framework that is so prevalent today. This section describes the
factors that led to the incorporation of “inefficiency” in Indiana state law
in 1843, as well as the concept’s relevance to post–Civil War reforms
concerning the federal civil service. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, “inefficiency” was associated not only with incompetence but with
the wasteful expenditure of government resources resulting from the
“spoils system,” in which key offices were distributed on the basis of political favoritism rather than merit. The term was thus added to the removal
lexicon at both the state and federal levels to enhance bureaucratic
effectiveness.
a. The Case of Indiana. — The middle decades of the nineteenth
century saw an uptick in state experimentation with tenures in office. Just
256. Professor Aditya Bamzai recounts an illuminating instance of a for-cause removal
during Taft’s presidency. See Bamzai, supra note 137, at 733–37. He describes the findings
of a 1913 report by a commission assembled by Taft (which included future Justice
Frankfurter) recommending the removal of two members of the Board of General
Appraisers, which Congress had established in 1890 to adjudicate disputes over duty
appraisals. The Report recommended removal of the members for “malfeasance in office”
and “neglect of duty,” finding, among other things, that one member had used “official
power to compel personal favors” from railroads and had interfered in adjudications before
the Board to aid his son, a litigator. Id. at 734–35 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting President’s Comm. of Inquiry on the Proc., Prac., Admin. Methods & Pers. of the
Bd. of the U.S. Gen. Appraisers, Separate Report on the Personnel 1–2, 4, 6–8 (1913),
microformed on The Papers of Felix Frankfurter (1983), reel 31 (Libr. of Cong.)
[hereinafter Separate Report on the Personnel]). The Report’s legal analysis, which Bamzai
describes as “sparse,” nevertheless reinforces this Article’s conclusions, interpreting
malfeasance as “misconduct,” “impropriety of conduct,” “maladministration,” or
“misbehavior showing clear and flagrant disqualification and unfitness to exercise the
office” and likening the term to the Constitution’s “high crimes and misdemeanors”
standard. Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Separate Report on the
Personnel, supra, at 12). The other member was found to be “incompetent”—a term used
as a synonym for inefficient—because he had “personal habits [that] destroy[ed] his usefulness as a member” and lacked “the necessary qualifications for the performance of his
duties”; the fact that he was not a lawyer and did not possess “a natural aptitude for [the
relevant] kind of [classification] work” rendered him, in the eyes of the committee, “totally
useless to the Board,” while his alcohol consumption had “brought scandal upon the
Board.” Id. at 736–37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Separate Report on the
Personnel, supra, at 13–14). Taft accepted the committee’s recommendations and dismissed
the members for malfeasance, neglect, and inefficiency in letters sent on his last day in
office; neither member pursued a legal challenge. See id. at 738.
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as other laws sought to protect states’ most valuable investments,
midcentury tenure experiments often aimed to ensure competent
management of ambitious state building projects such as railroads, canals,
and banks. The experience of Indiana, one of the first states to use the
INM standard in a removal statute, helps to tell the story.257
In 1836, Indiana invested heavily in a statewide system of canals and
railroads.258 The legislation enacting the projects was projected to cost over
$10 million, to be funded by bonds backed by state credit.259 In 1838, the
governor informed the state’s legislative assembly that while the interest
then due on the projects was $193,350, the state’s tax revenue was only
$45,000.260 One year later, the problem was significantly exacerbated by
the collapse of the Morris Canal and Banking Company, which had
received millions of dollars in Indiana state bonds on the promise of large
cash repayments.261 Work stopped on all internal improvements in August
1839.262
By 1841, Indiana needed to significantly tighten its belt. That
December, the governor reported to the legislature that “Indiana has been
in many instances the victim of preconcerted imposition and fraud.”263 He
urged further investigation and advised the legislature, “with a view to the
257. A law using inefficiency in the tenure context prior to Indiana’s 1843 code has not
been found, but there are several examples from the years that followed. See, e.g., Act of
Mar. 30, 1860, ch. 53, § 2, 1860 Iowa Acts 410, 410 (“The governor shall have power to
remove such commissioner for inefficiency and misconduct in the discharge of the duties
of his office, and to appoint some proper person in his place.”); Act of May 1, 1873, ch. 6,
§ 53, 1873 Ohio Laws 195, 209–10 (“The board of education of each school district shall
have . . . power to dismiss any appointee for inefficiency, neglect of duty, immorality or
improper conduct . . . .”).
258. See, e.g., Logan Esarey, A History of Indiana: From Its Exploration to 1850, at 363–
65 (1915).
259. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis, Fixing the Machine that Would Not
Go of Itself: State Constitutional Change and the Creation of an Open-Access Social Order
in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century United States 29–30 (Sept. 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://economics.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Faculty/Lamoreaux/Lamore
aux%20Wallis%2C%20Fixing%20the%20Machine%2C%202018-09-16.pdf [https://perma
.cc/3G3S-WQ7Z]; see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux & John Joseph Wallis, General Laws and
the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Transformation of American Political Economy:
Massachusetts, New York, Indiana, and Beyond 22–23 (Oct. 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ccl.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Lamoreaux%20and%20Wallis%2C%
20General%20Laws%2C%202019-10-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5QG-HFWN] [hereinafter Lamoreaux & Wallis, General Laws].
260. Esarey, supra note 258, at 368.
261. Lamoreaux & Wallis, General Laws, supra note 259, at 24–27. Logan Esarey
describes other financial shenanigans, such as how one group of canal commissioners kept
no books and whose poor management was what “finally bankrupted the State.” Esarey,
supra note 258, at 373.
262. Esarey, supra note 258, at 373.
263. Governor’s Message, Wabash Courier (Terre Haute, Ind.), Dec. 11, 1841 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
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most rigid economy,” to trim the public works staff, ensuring that those
retained “are competent, and under a proper supervision.”264
The following February, the state adopted a raft of legislative reforms,
including several changes to office tenure.265 The Indiana Constitution,
ratified in 1816, addressed the selection and tenure of state officers only
sparingly, hewing closely to the federal model and leaving it to the
legislature to supply the details.266 Seeking to ensure faithful execution of
government work, the reforms included a range of new offices and
tenures. Specific canal, railroad, and turnpike agents would be elected by
the Indiana General Assembly for two-year terms “subject to removal, at
any time, by joint resolution of the general assembly.”267 The
superintendent of the state prison, which had been the subject of frequent
“rumors . . . of mismanagement and want of proper attention,”268 would
be elected by the General Assembly to a five-year term, removable by joint
resolution only “for misconduct, inefficiency, or neglect of duty in his
office.”269 The governor’s private secretary would be appointed by the
governor and serve a one-year term on good behavior; notary publics, also
appointed by the governor on good behavior, would serve five years.270 The
clerk of the state prison would likewise be appointed by the governor to a
five-year term, but could be removed by the governor “for incompetency,
neglect of duty, or maleconduct [sic] in office.”271 The prison’s visitor,272
meanwhile, would be appointed by the governor to a one-year term with
no removal provision, but no one from the town of Jeffersonville—the

264. Id.
265. The governor’s proposals were part of a revised code he had drafted at the
legislature’s behest. The legislature apparently saw no constitutional problem with asking a
sitting executive to rewrite the state’s laws. On the muddying of lines between the branches
of government where statutory revision was concerned, see Farah Peterson, Interpretation
as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of American Statutory
Interpretation, 77 Md. L. Rev. 712, 717 (2018). On the nineteenth-century American
codification movement and the spread of state codes in general, see Kellen Funk & Lincoln
Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and U.S. Legal Practice, 123 Am.
Hist. Rev. 132, 137 (2018).
266. The 1816 Constitution specified that the governor “shall nominate, and, by and
with the advice and consent of the senate, appoint and commission all officers, the
appointment of which is not otherwise directed by this Constitution, and all offices . . .
created by the General Assembly, shall be filled . . . as . . . directed by law.” Ind. Const. of
1816, art. IV, § 8.
267. 1843 Ind. Rev. Stat., ch. 4, § 36.
268. Governor’s Message, supra note 263.
269. 1843 Ind. Rev. Stat., ch. 4, § 37.
270. Id. §§ 39–40.
271. Id. § 41.
272. The visitor of an eleemosynary institution was charged with ensuring that it was
continuing to serve the purpose for which it had been created. See 1 Blackstone, supra note
160, bk. I, ch. 18, at 478–79.
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town in which the prison was located, and the source of frequent
complaints of prison mismanagement273—was eligible for the role.274
The judges of the supreme court would be appointed on good
behavior by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate but
would be limited to a seven-year term.275 The supreme court could appoint
its own clerk to a seven-year renewable term, but it possessed no removal
authority before those seven years were up.276 The court’s sheriff would
also be appointed by the court and could be removed by the court at any
time “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or maleconduct in office.”277
Indiana’s inventive use of the tenure toolkit reveals both anxieties
about the state’s governance and a belief that strategically crafted office
tenures could solve the problems of government corruption, mismanagement, and waste. By including “inefficiency” as grounds for removing the
prison superintendent and the court’s sheriff, Indiana used a word whose
meaning shifted over the course of the nineteenth century from a synonym
for ineffectiveness to something closer to our current understanding of
minimization of waste, especially where that waste resulted from selfinterested dealing.278 The legislature used the word purposefully, focusing
273. See Governor’s Message, supra note 263.
274. 1843 Ind. Rev. Stat., ch. 4, § 42.
275. Id. §§ 44–45.
276. Id. § 46.
277. Id. § 47. The specification of “misconduct” in the case of the prison
superintendent and “maleconduct” in the case of the prison clerk and the supreme court’s
sheriff was likely not an instance of sloppy drafting but rather deliberate references to two
different kinds of misbehavior. While neither word was included in law dictionaries of the
period, see, e.g., Bouvier, 1839 ed., supra note 224, words such as “malfeasance,”
“misfeasance,” and “misbehavior” were. On the basis of the distinctions among these terms,
we speculate that misconduct referred to a pattern of misfeasance, which was in turn “the
performance of an act which might lawfully be done, in an improper manner, by which
another person receives an injury.” Id. at 135. Maleconduct, meanwhile, was probably used
to refer to a pattern of illegal acts. See, e.g., id. at 90 (“Malfeasance . . . is the unjust
performance of some act which the party had no right, or which he had contracted not to
do. It differs from misfeasance . . . and nonfeasance . . . .”).
278. See generally Jennifer Karns Alexander, The Mantra of Efficiency: From
Waterwheel to Social Control (2008) (tracing, through six case studies, the evolution of
“efficiency” from a term applied mainly to machines to one applied to human behavior);
Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–
1920 (1964) (offering an intellectual history of the influence of the idea of efficiency on
major progressive political thinkers and proposals, including the importance of a strong
executive and the separation of politics from administration); Emmette S. Redford, Ideal
and Practice in Public Administration 4 (1958) (“Until the twentieth century [efficiency]
seems to have been synonymous with effectiveness in achieving results, i.e. without respects
to costs incurred . . . . But the literature of . . . public management made men familiar with
the idea that achievement of results with unnecessary expenditure of effort, time, and
money was obviously inefficiency.”); Efficient, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/efficient [https://perma.cc/Z9E9-8UFL] (last visited Oct. 20,
2020) (defining “efficiency” as “productive of desired results; especially: capable of
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on positions where competence and honesty were at a premium. The
superintendent oversaw an institution that took up a sizable chunk of state
resources and was rumored to use them in a profligate (if not corrupt)
manner. In a state desperate for revenue, meanwhile, the supreme court
sheriff’s timely and effective performance of his duties—in particular,
serving writs of attachment—was key to the state’s ability to collect on its
debts. Adding inefficiency to the lexicon of removal law was an effort to
relieve Indiana’s financial burdens by ensuring that its officers did their
jobs competently and honestly.
b. Civil Service Reform. — In the aftermath of the Civil War, efficiency
became a prime objective for lawmakers who sought to reduce the size and
cost of government, as peacetime brought a focus on taxpayer relief.279
This emphasis on financial austerity dovetailed with a growing hostility to
patronage practices that both parties had used for decades to reward party
loyalists with federal jobs.280 The most vocal opponents of the patronage
power were people who saw themselves as outside of and above politics:
lawyers and businessmen who sought to use principles of economy and

producing desired effects with little or no waste (as of time or materials)”). Case law from
this period suggests both this earlier sense and the term’s gradual and ongoing shift in
meaning. Examples of the term’s earlier usage include: Lowry v. The Portland, 15 F. Cas.
1052, 1052, 1056 (D. Mass. 1839) (dismissing a suit against a steamship where the collision
had not been caused by the captain’s “gross carelessness, inefficiency, and
mismanagement”); Bulkley v. Chapman, 11 Conn. 5, 8–9 (1831) (describing a poorly
conceived deed that threatened to frustrate the intent of the parties, thanks to the
“inefficiency” of the contract); and Boyle v. Reeder, 23 N.C. 607, 613 (1841) (Ruffin, C.J.)
(holding that a jury could award damages for “the inefficiency of the work” involved in a
made-to-order engine, “whether arising from the badness of the materials or workmanship,
or because it did not correspond in form and parts with the contract”). Cases arising during
and after the Civil War that reflect the term’s evolving meaning include: Smith v. Whitney,
116 U.S. 167, 169, 182 (1886) (declining to prohibit court-martial from trying a Navy officer
on a charge of “culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty” for unlawfully altering
terms of supplier contracts); Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U.S. 45, 54 (1864) (Field, J.)
(finding that an agreement promising compensation upon the procurement of a
government contract to furnish war supplies is unenforceable, as such agreements “directly
lead to inefficiency in the public service” and instead suggesting such contracts go to
“those . . . who will execute them most faithfully, and at the least expense”); Hudson v. State,
76 Ga. 727, 731 (1886) (finding that a lawyer drunk at his client’s trial for murder might be
judged “inefficient”); People ex rel. Campbell v. Campbell, 82 N.Y. 247, 252 (1880) (noting
that the fact that an arch had been constructed imperfectly and with bad material “prove[d]
inefficiency or dishonesty” on the part of the supervising city engineer). In the Hudson case,
note that the language resembles the contemporary “ineffective assistance of counsel”
standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984).
279. See A. Bower Sageser, The First Two Decades of the Pendleton Act: A Study of Civil
Service Reform 17 (1935) (describing the public desire for a return to prewar
expenditures); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of
National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920, at 50 (1982) (describing the widely held
interest in retrenchment).
280. See Skowronek, supra note 279, at 50–53; see also Fish, supra note 132, 210–12.
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efficiency to break party corruption and lower tax bills in the process.281 It
was their belief that efficiency was the key to effective government and
could only be achieved by extracting politics from administration that
motivated Congress’s civil service reform efforts from 1865 through the
passage of the first major reform law, the Pendleton Act, in 1883.282
Between 1865 and 1868, Rhode Island’s Thomas Allen Jenckes, a
wealthy lawyer, a member of Congress’s Joint Select Committee on
Retrenchment,283 and a staunch ally of civil service reformers, introduced
several bills and reports aimed at overhauling government administration.284 “Let us seek,” Jenckes urged his colleagues, “to obtain skill, ability,
fidelity, zeal and integrity in the public service, and we shall not be called
upon to increase salaries or the number of offices.”285 By rooting out
“inefficient” men and replacing them with “competent” ones, he assured,
the “efficiency of the whole force of the civil service [will be] increased
[by] one half.”286 By overhauling the civil service, Jenckes and his
colleagues promised to eradicate what they saw as inextricably connected
evils: wasteful government spending and the patronage power.
To achieve these objectives, the Select Committee proposed to
establish a civil service commission to determine eligibility criteria for civil

281. See Martin J. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and
Reform in America, 1800–1920, at 8–10 (1977); Skowronek, supra note 279, at 52.
282. See Skowronek, supra note 279, at 51–53. On separating politics and
administration, see Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 263–65 (1885).
283. The Committee was formed by joint resolution on July 19, 1866. See H.R. Rep. No.
39-8, at 1 (1867). Prior to the Select Committee’s creation, Jenckes was a member of the
Select Committee on the Civil Service, and it was in this capacity that he introduced his 1866
reform bill. H.R. 673, 39th Cong. (1866).
284. See Fish, supra note 132, at 210–12; Sageser, supra note 279, at 15–19; Skowronek,
supra note 279, at 51. Charles Sumner had introduced a bill aimed at civil service reform in
1864, but Sageser, Skowronek, and Fish identify Jenckes’s bill as the start of the legislative
movement for reform. Notably, Sumner’s bill omits any mention of efficiency but does
specify that applicants for the civil service examination shall be “citizens,” a category he
defines to include “all persons born in the United States, and not owing allegiance
elsewhere.” See 8 Charles Sumner, The Works of Charles Sumner 453 (Boston, Lee &
Shepard 1883). In 1864, four years before the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized
birthright citizenship, this was a boldly egalitarian claim. The bill also contained a proviso
stipulating that although civil service posts within a particular state’s borders were to go to
applicants who had lived in that state for at least one year preceding the applicant’s
examination, the President could suspend this requirement for any state or portion of a
state as he saw fit. See id. These specifications suggest that at least part of Sumner’s focus in
proposing civil service legislation was to ensure that African Americans would be eligible for
federal jobs at the war’s end, that their candidacies would be assessed at least in part on the
basis of merit, and that civil service positions in the South would not be limited to longtime
locals with uncertain allegiances. See 4 Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles
Sumner, 1860–1874, at 190–92 (Boston, Roberts Brothers 1893).
285. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 838–39 (1867) (statement of Rep. Jenckes).
286. Id.
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service officers287 and to identify and rank promising candidates through
a civil service exam.288 Removal, crucially, would also be limited under the
Committee’s plan: The commission would have the “power to prescribe,
by general rules, what misconduct or inefficiency shall be sufficient for the
removal or suspension” of civil service officers, and to “establish rules” for
the “trial of the accused.”289 In the words of British reformer John Stuart
Mill, whose writings the Select Committee frequently quoted, limitations
like these were necessary to enable the civil service to attract serious
professionals. “With regard to that large and important body which
constitutes the permanent strength of the public service,” Mill had written,
those who do not change with changes of politics, but remain to
aid every minister by their experience and traditions . . . those, in
short, who form the class of professional public servants, entering
their profession as others do while young . . . ; it is evidently
inadmissible that these should be liable to be turned out, and
deprived of the whole benefit of their previous service, except for
positive, proved, and serious misconduct.290
By limiting removal to proven instances of inefficiency or misconduct,
the latter a category that Mill’s excerpt defined as including unlawful acts,
“voluntary neglect of duty, or conduct implying untrustworthiness for the
purposes for which . . . trust is given,”291 Jenckes and his colleagues hoped
to attract highly promising civil service candidates and inspire in them
earnestness, diligence, and an “esprit du [sic] corps” that would prove a
powerful “stimulant to success.”292 In employing the term “inefficiency,”
they used a word whose meaning had been established by case law.293 Like

287. The bill applied to all civil officers who were not required by law to be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See Thomas Allen Jenckes, Joint
Select Comm. on Retrenchment, The Civil Service: Report of Mr. Jenckes, of Rhode Island,
from the Joint Select Committee on Retrenchment, Made to the House of Representatives
of the United States, May 14, 1868, at 217 (Wash., D.C., Gov’t Printing Off. 1868)
[hereinafter Jenckes, Civil Service Report].
288. Jenckes specified that women as well as men were eligible for the civil service—this
alone, he assured, would generate considerable savings, presumably because women would
command lower salaries. See id. at 219; Sageser, supra note 279, at 17.
289. Jenckes, Civil Service Report, supra note 287, at 218.
290. H.R. Rep. 39-8, at 4 (1867) (quoting John Stuart Mill).
291. Id.
292. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 841 (1867) (statement of Rep. Jenckes). In the
civil service reform bill Jenckes introduced in June 1866, he used “malfeasance” as a term
encompassing both inefficiency and misconduct. See H.R. 673, 39th Cong. § 5 (1866).
293. See supra note 278; see also State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, 55
N.W. 118, 121 (Minn. 1893) (explaining that “incompetency might result from physical
disability, from mental disability, or from lack of integrity” and that “inefficiency might
consist of habitual neglect of duty, incapacity to preserve discipline, or of a variety of
things”).
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neglect and malfeasance, inefficiency required notice and a hearing,294
and it had an objective rather than a subjective meaning: An officer could
not be replaced simply because the would-be remover believed someone
else was more “efficient.”295 Inefficiency, in the states and in the series of
civil service reform bills put forward over the next fifteen years, was a high
bar to removal: Inefficient employees were those whose actions
demonstrated that they could not be relied on to do the job they were
hired to do.
C.

The Birth of the Independent Commission

The need for federal regulation of the nation’s increasingly complex
economy led Congress to incorporate state innovations in federal office
design: to create offices for a term of years with discrete removal permissions to ensure maximum effectiveness and administrative efficacy. This
section examines the creation of the ICC, the independent agency that
first featured INM and that served as the model for the dozens of independent agencies that Congress has established in the years since.296 As we
demonstrate, Congress’s decision to incorporate INM in the ICC’s
enabling statute was based on the lessons it drew from earlier state efforts
at regulation—efforts that taught federal legislators that for the commis-

294. See, e.g., Lynch v. Chase, 40 P. 666, 666–67 (Kan. 1895) (noting that “it is well
settled that where an officer is chosen for a definite term, and provision is made for his
removal for cause, the causes for removal must be alleged, the party notified, and a hearing
had” before removal for “inefficiency, immorality, misconduct,” or inattention to duty);
Hart, 55 N.W. at 119 (explaining that removal of a fire commissioner for “inefficiency” is
“adversary and judicial” in nature, requires notice and a hearing, and “may be reviewed on
certiorari”); People ex rel. Campbell v. Campbell, 82 N.Y. 247, 250–51 (1880) (explaining
that the standard for removal of the chief engineer of the department of public works for
inefficiency is high because protection given to his tenure is “substantial and effective”
rather than “merely shadowy or formal”); People ex rel. Munday v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 72
N.Y. 445, 449–50 (1878) (requiring that removal of a fire department clerk be for cause,
meaning “some dereliction or general neglect of duty, or incapacity to perform the duties,
or some delinquency affecting his general character and his fitness for office,” and that
cause be explained in the notice and at a hearing).
295. See, e.g., Hart, 55 N.W. at 121 (striking as legally insufficient charges of inefficiency
against a fire commissioner, explaining that inefficiency “might consist of habitual neglect
of duty” or “incapacity to preserve discipline” and that to be legally sufficient the charges
must “advise the officer in what respect he is claimed to be . . . inefficient”); Munday, 72
N.Y. at 449 (noting that where removal is “for cause,” the cause invoked must be “personal
to [the officeholder],” meaning the availability of “a better man than the accused, or [one]
more congenial to the appointing or removing power is . . . no cause of removal within the
statute”).
296. Professor Jerry Mashaw notes that the ICC was far from the first independent
federal agency, a label he assigns to the Patent Office, created ninety-seven years earlier.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of
American Administrative Law 5 (2012).

2021]

THE THREE PERMISSIONS

53

sion to be effective, commissioners needed insulation from political intermeddling, while the executive needed the ability to remove commissioners
who were manifestly neglectful, malfeasant, or incompetent.
1. The Need for Federal Regulation. — The first federal law to
incorporate the now-familiar INM removal provisions was the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICA), passed in early 1887 and modeled on similar state
statutes. The ICA regulated interstate railroads, whose rates and business
practices had produced varying degrees of political outrage for decades.297
States began passing oversight legislation in earnest in the 1870s,298 and by
1883, the year the ICA’s Senate sponsor first proposed a federal
commission, twenty-five states had their own railroad commissions.299
Roughly half of those state commissions were primarily supervisory, with
the power to recommend legislation and arbitrate disputes between
railroads and private citizens but not to set rates or refer disputes for
prosecution.300 The other half could set rates and call on the attorney
general to prosecute rate violations in court, where railroads bore the
burden of showing that their deviation from prescribed rates was
reasonable.301
Although the push for federal regulation had been underway long
before the Supreme Court held in Wabash, Saint Louis and Pacific Railway
Co. v. Illinois that states could not regulate rates on interstate lines,302 the
1886 decision effectively forced Congress’s hand.303 The idea that the
297. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
298. See Frederick C. Clark, State Railroad Commissions and How They May Be Made
Effective, in 6 Publications of the American Economic Association 11, 12, 22 (1891); George
H. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws 154–56 (1971) [hereinafter Miller, Railroads and
the Granger Laws]. New Hampshire was an early adopter; it established a railroad
commission in 1844, although its initial focus was on safety rather than rates. Clark, supra,
at 23.
299. Clark, supra note 298, at app. tbl.I. Four of these commissions did not supervise,
advise, or regulate, but instead existed to assess taxes, collect statistics, or both. Id.
300. Id. at app. tbls.I–IV. We rely here on Frederick Clark’s appendix, which presents
tables that group state commissions into different classes based on their relative power,
despite inevitable areas of overlap. The primary dividing line between “weak” and “strong”
appears to be whether the commissions’ rates could serve as prima facie evidence of
reasonableness in court and whether the railroad would bear the burden of proof. See id.
at app. tbl.IV.
301. Id. at 33–35, app. tbls.II–IV. George Miller shows that the Illinois legislature’s
decision to cede the definition of reasonableness to the courts was a major win for the
railroads; farmers and other shippers would have preferred to leave the definition of
reasonableness in legislative hands. See Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws, supra note
298, at 89–96.
302. 118 U.S. 557, 563 (1886).
303. See Shelby Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service: Personal Recollections of Shelby
M. Cullom, Senior United States Senator from Illinois 312–13 (1911); Cushman, supra note
1, at 38. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., hardly a radical, had written fifteen years earlier that
the fact “[t]hat the national government must then, soon or late, and in a greater or less
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country’s railroads needed a federal regulatory framework had long
attracted adherents, including farmers, shippers, and even some railroad
men who wanted to end rate wars and other harmful competition.304 The
mechanism for federal regulation was less clear. John Reagan, a Democratic House member from Texas, favored a regime in which competition
would set rates subject to judicial review for reasonableness.305 In the
Senate, however, Shelby Cullom, Illinois’s junior Senator, was a firm
proponent of a commission system.
2. The Inclusion of INM. — When Cullom introduced a bill proposing
the creation of a federal railroad regulatory commission in December
1883, he drew on ideas he had developed as both a state legislator and a
governor. The railroad regulatory regime in Cullom’s home state of
Illinois was generally considered a model “strong” state commission
system,306 and Cullom had been Illinois’s House speaker when the
commission was being developed and governor during its early years.307 To
Cullom, a system of “five wise, able, experienced men of reputation,
commanding general confidence and clothed with a limited discretion”
was necessary to ensure an effective regulatory regime,308 and that is what
he proposed in December of 1883.
Cullom’s first bill differed from Illinois’s law in two pertinent respects:
It did not require an oath from commissioners to faithfully execute the
duties of their office, and it did not provide any mechanism to remove
commissioners before the end of their terms.309 By leaving out an oath
requirement, Cullom probably intended to preclude private suits for
neglect or malfeasance, which Cullom would have viewed as allowing
politically motivated interference by interested parties. Omitting removal

degree, assume a railroad jurisdiction, is accepted as an obvious conclusion to be deduced
from the irresistible development of the system.” Charles Francis Adams, Jr., The
Government and the Railroad Corporations, 112 N. Am. Rev. 31 (1871), reprinted in R.R.
Gazette, Jan. 14, 1871, at 362, 363 [hereinafter Adams, Government and the Railroad
Corporations].
304. Political historians have identified a range of influences leading to the passage of
the ICA. See, e.g., Lee Benson, Merchants, Farmers, & Railroads: Railroad Regulation and
New York Politics, 1850–1887, at 204–07 (1955); Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation,
1877–1916, at 30–44 (1965); Skowronek, supra note 279, at 131, 139; see also Edward A.
Purcell, Jr., Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 J. Am.
Hist. 561, 562–75 (1967) (describing the contributions of various historians).
305. Skowronek, supra note 279, at 140–45.
306. See, e.g., id. at 146; see also Clark, supra note 298, at 32–35 (describing Illinois’s as
a typical “strong” commission); Cushman, supra note 1, at 26.
307. See Cullom, supra note 303, at 306.
308. Skowronek, supra note 279, at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Shelby Cullom); see also Cullom, supra note 303, at 306–10.
309. A Bill to Establish a Board of Railroad Commissioners, to Regulate Inter-State
Commerce, and for Other Purposes, S. 840, 48th Cong. §§ 1–10 (1883) [hereinafter 1883
Bill].
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authority would likewise insulate commissioners from politically motivated
interference by the President.
In contrast to Cullom’s federal proposal, Illinois’s statute allowed the
governor to remove commissioners for multiple causes. Under the terms
of Illinois’s 1870 Constitution, the governor was authorized to remove any
officer he had appointed “in cases of incompetency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”310 And under the terms of the railroad statute, he
was authorized to remove a commissioner who had violated the statute’s
prohibition on having an interest in or connection with a railroad.311 This
latter provision had been fiercely criticized in the nation’s leading treatise
on railroad regulation because it left state governors
[s]o afraid . . . of a bias, that they sought out men whose minds
were a blank . . . . [S]ome very competent men were appointed
who did excellent work so long as they remained in office. But a
long continuance in office was again looked upon as undesirable,
and these men were either speedily removed to make way for
incompetents, or they voluntarily passed into the employ of the
railroad corporations before they had fairly mastered the
situation.312
Instead of barring railroad men and allowing for executive removal,
Cullom’s federal bill provided terms of five years.313 By allowing railroad
men to serve on his commission, Cullom likely sought to avoid some of the
perceived problems with commissioner ineptitude. His omission of
removal permissions, meanwhile, may have been an oversight. But it is also
plausible that Cullom thought that stipulating a term of years was a
sufficient solution, because it both avoided politically motivated removals
and allowed the President and Senate to simply not re-appoint an
unsatisfactory commissioner once his term was up.
The Senate’s Select Committee on Railroads significantly revised
Cullom’s original proposal, and four changes are especially important.
Where the original 1883 bill focused only on rate discrimination,314 the
310. Ill. Const. of 1870, art. V, § 12.
311. See Act of July 1, 1871, § 2, 1871 Ill. Laws 618, 619.
312. Charles Francis Adams, Jr., Railroads: Their Origin and Problems 133–34 (1878)
[hereinafter Adams, Origin and Problems]. Adams was widely recognized as one of the
nation’s top experts on the railroad problem and had himself served on Massachusetts’s
railroad commission. See Adams, Government and the Railroad Corporations, supra note
303, at 362; see also Cushman, supra note 1, at 24 (noting Adams’s fame as a railroad
expert). And he was far from alone in believing familiarity with railroad operations was
essential to a well-functioning commission. See, e.g., 1 S. Rep. No. 49-46, app. at 24 (1886)
(statement of John D. Kernan) (“A commission ought to consist of not less than five
members, with two . . . of them having railroad experience. [But] [t]hey should not be
permitted to be interested in the stock . . . of any carrier, nor to accept from carriers
anything except the facilities needed to discharge their duties.”).
313. 1883 Bill, supra note 309, § 1.
314. Id. §§ 4, 8.
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1884 commission focused on discrimination and “extortion,” defined as
charging “more than a reasonable rate.”315 Where the 1883 commission
merely “exercise[ed] supervision” over the interstate portion of a
transportation company’s business,316 the 1884 commission supervised all
“methods of operation” of any transportation company engaged in interstate commerce.317 Where the 1883 commission investigated complaints of
discrimination only where the commissioners “deemed [it] necessary,”318
the 1884 commission was obliged to investigate any complaint of extortion
or unjust discrimination it received.319 And where the strongest medicine
the 1883 commission could apply to discriminating companies was to
include their offenses in the commission’s annual report to the
President,320 the 1884 commission was empowered to assess damages on
any transportation company found guilty of extortion or unjust
discrimination and to refer to the U.S. attorney for prosecution any
company that refused to pay.321
These changes meaningfully enhanced the commission’s supervisory
powers and probably led to the bill’s other noteworthy amendments: a
requirement that partisan imbalance on the commission should never
exceed 3-2 and a removal provision stipulating that “any commissioner
may be removed by the President for incompetency or malfeasance in
office.”322 Having amended the bill so that it carried the threat of real
consequences for private actors, its drafters were likely anxious to guard
against both partisan chicanery and the misbehavior of an inept or
unfaithful commissioner.
The idea that a railroad commission ought to be both expert and
impartial was, as we have seen, nothing new. Nor was the need to protect
those expert commissioners from outside influence—be it from politically
motivated removals or from the temptations of quid pro quo arrangements. To protect against the “inferior and, not seldom, corrupt men”
who made up the majority of state commissioners, regulation advocates
had urged the Illinois legislature as far back as 1871 to “create an able and
experienced tribunal to stand between the community and its railroads . . .
clothe[d] . . . with all necessary power and dignity, and . . . declare its
315. A Bill to Establish a Commission to Regulate Inter-State Commerce, and for Other
Purposes, S. 2112, 48th Cong. § 3 (1884) [hereinafter 1884 Bill].
316. 1883 Bill, supra note 309, § 3.
317. 1884 Bill, supra note 315, § 2.
318. 1883 Bill, supra note 309, § 4.
319. 1884 Bill, supra note 315, § 5.
320. 1883 Bill, supra note 309, §§ 6, 8.
321. 1884 Bill, supra note 315, §§ 5, 6.
322. Id. § 1. Other changes in the bill were probably also made to account for this
augmented authority: increased commissioner salaries (from $5,000 to $7,500 per year), id.
§ 7, and a direction that commissioner appointments be made “so that the different
interests affected by this act shall have, as nearly as possible, proper representation,” id. § 1.
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decisions final on all points upon which no appeal lay . . . by constitutional
right.”323 Only such an august commission, comprising men whose
“duties, . . . responsibilities, and . . . characters” were equal “with those of
the judges of our courts,” would be able to command the railroads’ respect
and compel their obedience.324
This was also the message that Cullom and his Senate colleagues
received from several of the experts they interviewed in the spring and
summer of 1885.325 To ensure the commission would be capable of both
designing and enforcing prudent regulations, these witnesses advised that
the commission should be as court-like as possible, comprising wellregarded and well-compensated men endowed with the power to try
violations and impose penalties.326 Only a court-like tribunal composed of
railroad specialists with the power to enforce their findings, these witnesses
explained, would be able to effectively regulate the nation’s rails.
The members of the select committee were receptive to this
argument, but they had one sticking point: the tenure protections that
adhered to officials who exercised such judge-like authority. “If we clothe
the commission with judicial power,” Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut
observed, “we must make them judges and give them a life tenure.”327 That
was a problem, in Platt’s eyes. “The idea has prevailed,” he explained,
“that it was not really a good thing to appoint judges, who may be unworthy
judges, with a life tenure.”328 What if, Platt was asking, the appointed
commissioners, clothed with judge-like power and judge-like job security,
turned out not to be up to the task?
The version of the bill that emerged from the select committee’s
months of expert consultation included, for our purposes, four salient
changes: It backed several of the bill’s provisions with the threat of
escalating court remedies,329 it made the commission’s findings prima
facie evidence in subsequent court proceedings,330 it barred any
commissioner from participating in a hearing or proceeding in which that
commissioner had a “pecuniary interest,”331 and it declared that the
commissioners could be “removed by the President for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”332 The reason for the
committee’s shift from “incompetency or malfeasance in office” to INM is
323. Adams, Government and the Railroad Corporations, supra note 303, at 364–65.
324. Id. at 364.
325. See Cullom, supra note 303, at 314–15.
326. See, e.g., The Railway Question: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Interstate
Com., 49th Cong. 10, 18 (1885) (statement of Simon Sterne).
327. Id. at 11.
328. Id. at 18.
329. See A Bill to Regulate Commerce, S. 1093, 49th Cong. § 5 (1886).
330. Id. § 9.
331. Id. § 12.
332. Id. § 6.
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not explained. But the select committee’s expressed concerns about the
problem of life tenure combined with both the widely shared belief in the
importance of commissioner expertise and the revised bill’s sharper teeth
suggest that at least part of the reason was prophylactic: a desire to guard
against the problem of inept or corrupt commissioners. “Inefficiency,” in
this context, conveyed a meaning that incompetency did not. Efficiency,
as we have seen, with its association with both ability and moral rectitude,
had been the watchword of Congress’s recent debates over the Pendleton
Act, and it had likewise been a focus of many of the select committee’s
expert witnesses.333 An inefficient commissioner—a commissioner unable
to comprehend the technical reports and complicated account books of
the railroads he oversaw, or dishonest and unscrupulous in the exercise of
his duties—would pose a considerable threat to the commission’s
effectiveness. So too would a commissioner who failed to attend hearings,
refused to pursue complaints, or otherwise ignored the duties of the office.
Having built a commission with significant investigatory and enforcement
chops, the committee drafters were unwilling to risk its being upended by
a dishonest, incompetent, or neglectful commissioner.
By authorizing the President to remove commissioners for INM, the
bill provided an escape hatch in case the commission failed to accomplish
its important work. At the same time, by providing commissioners with
terms of years qualified only by discrete, limited removal permissions, the
bill insulated the commissioners from both “the temptations of their
position”334 and the politically motivated removals that had plagued state
commissions.335 When the measure finally passed both houses and was
signed by President Cleveland a year later, it retained these key provisions.
3. The Missing Constitutional Concern. — The years of congressional
debate over the ICC reveal an omission that might surprise modern
proponents of presidential power. Despite the ICA’s obvious significance
at the time,336 almost no one contested its removal provisions.337 Senator
333. See supra notes 279–282, 325–328 and accompanying text.
334. 1 S. Rep. 49-46, app. at 24–25 (1886) (statement of John D. Kernan).
335. See, e.g., Adams, Origin and Problems, supra note 312, at 133–34. In 1926, Edward
Corwin reached much the same conclusion about the aims underlying the ICA’s use of INM.
See Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power under the Constitution, 27
Colum. L. Rev. 353, 356 (1927) [hereinafter Corwin, Tenure of Office].
336. See Skowronek, supra note 279, at 138 (describing the Act as passing “[n]ine years
and a hundred legislative proposals after a serious effort to obtain national regulation had
begun”).
337. Professor Aditya Bamzai observes the same absence of concern over the Board of
General Appraisers (BGA), created by Congress in 1890 to oversee tariff disputes, despite
the fact that virtually the only difference between the BGA’s structure and removal
provisions and those of the ICC was the absence of a term of years, a difference later
addressed in Shurtleff. See supra note 137. During debate over the BGA, Bamzai writes,
concern over any perceived encroachments on the President’s removal power prompted
“only a single express reference and two passing allusions.” Bamzai, supra note 137, at 714.
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John Morgan of Alabama was the only exception, and even his arguments
do not support contemporary theories about removal. In a last-ditch effort
to scuttle the bill, Morgan objected to the omission of an oath
requirement, reasoning that this meant that the President’s removal
power was the sole check on commissioner corruption, with ample
opportunities for political manipulation.338 But the bill’s supporters
dismissed Morgan’s criticisms as so much sanctimony—“[t]o listen to the
senator from Alabama . . . descanting upon the provisions of the bill,”
Cullom retorted, “one can scarcely resist the conclusion that it is a bill to
destroy the commerce of the country, and especially to break down all the
railroads”339—and passed the bill 43-15 a few hours later.340
In the House, members paid close attention to the President’s power
to appoint, with Congressman James Weaver of Iowa protesting that under
the bill’s staggered terms the next President would have the power to place
three political partisans on the commission. But Weaver never mentioned
political bias due to the President’s power to remove; the possibility that
removal could be exploited for political ends seems not to have occurred
to him.341 The bill’s regulatory provisions were the subject of weeks of
debate. But although everyone knew that the statute gave the President
only limited removal authority, not one legislator objected that such limits
might be unconstitutional.
It would be implausible to read Congress’s silence as evidence that its
members assumed, contrary to longstanding practice, that the ICA’s term
of years coupled with discrete removal permissions gave the President
broad removal authority. Nor does Congress’s silence mean that its
members were simply unaware of or unfocused on removal questions
during this period. On the contrary, two contemporaneous debates reveal
intense congressional attention to the President’s removal power as well as
its broader implications for executive power.
The first debate, concerning a board of education for the District of
Columbia, took place in the House a month before the ICA’s passage.
Statutory language prescribed that the commissioners of Washington,
D.C., “may, in their discretion, at any time remove any or all of said
[Board] members from office and fill the vacancies by new appointment.”342 A few congressmen worried that new board members might
endanger the district’s superintendent, but the bill’s supporters dismissed
that concern. “[R]emember that these . . . men have no power over [the
superintendent’s] appointment except to advise,” one member
emphasized, and the board members “are themselves the creatures of the
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See 18 Cong. Rec. 657 (1887) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
Id. at 658 (statement of Sen. Cullom).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 820 (statement of Rep. Weaver).
Id. at 121.
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District commissioners, appointed by them and by them subject to removal
at pleasure.”343 These removal provisions were “given to the bill,” they
explained, “to keep it in harmony with the idea . . . that the whole power
of government is vested in the commissioners.”344 This statement was not
controverted.
The House clearly understood the long-established principle that the
combination of a term of years plus removal provisions was designed to
strike a balance between protecting an officer’s independence and
preventing harmful official conduct. More specifically, if subordinates
could be removed “at any time” in the “discretion” of their superiors, such
individuals were effectively “the creatures” of the controlling executive. By
contrast, the ICA’s tenure provisions allowed little room for executive
control, in terms that were themselves already familiar from similar provisions in state law and which served goals of independence and “faithful
execution” that were centuries old. Congress drafted the ICA’s language
to be different from the Washington, D.C., board of education legislation,
and even the House members who were most anxious about excessive
presidential control didn’t bother to mention them. Everyone understood
that the removal provisions represented an explicit compromise between
granting officials enough independence to perform their designated tasks,
while providing superiors with enough authority to remove officers who
failed to efficiently and faithfully execute their duties. It was entirely
ordinary that concerns about what Holt and the Constitution called
“faithful execution” should exist on both sides of the ledger. And it was
also entirely ordinary that Congress would be the institution to design the
appropriate balance.
The second removal debate during this period explicitly analyzed
presidential control over federal officers. One day after the House
discussed the removal provisions of the Washington, D.C., board of
education bill, and one day before the Congressional Record printed the
ICA conference bill in its entirety,345 the Senate debated whether to repeal
the Tenure of Office Act (TOA), the 1869 law that required Senate
approval before the President removed any executive officer appointed to
a term by and with the Senate’s advice and consent.346 Repeal was
necessary, as Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts argued, because the

343. Id. at 127 (statement of Rep. Grout).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 171–73.
346. The 1869 law revised the earlier 1867 version that had been at issue in President
Andrew Johnson’s impeachment trial. The revisions, passed shortly after Ulysses S. Grant
became President, made the 1867 law essentially a dead letter, because they allowed the
President to suspend and appoint a successor at his discretion. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 10,
sec. 2, § 2, 16 Stat. 6, 7 (1869).
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TOA unconstitutionally abridged the President’s duty to ensure “the
faithful execution of the laws.”347
Senators’ reasons for reaching that constitutional conclusion were
varied. Senator Hoar, for instance, believed that it was unconstitutional to
hold the President responsible for the acts of officers “forced upon him
against his will.”348 Thus, when an officer’s “conduct in office is to be
determined by political theories or opinions,” the President should have
the right to remove him at will.349 Senator William Evarts of New York,
meanwhile, believed that there was a difference between an unconstitutional law like the Tenure of Office Act, with an express purpose of
requiring Senate approval to remove any jointly appointed office, and
Congress’s “right to impress upon an office an indelible durability according to the will of the lawmaking power.”350 Evarts confessed his own bias as
former chief counsel for President Andrew Johnson during his Senate
impeachment trial for, among other offenses, having violated the Tenure
of Office Act.351 Yet even Evarts had “never been able . . . to conclude that
a law which should affix a certain degree of durability in tenure of an office
was in and of itself unconstitutional.”352 If the public interest required an
office to be constituted for a term of five or six years—with either no
presidential removal, or removal only by the President, or removal only by
impeachment—Evarts reasoned that this would not raise constitutional
concerns because such provisions lay “in the very bed of law-making
authority.”353 No senator spoke against Evarts’s constitutional argument,
which was fully consistent with the history of American removal law.
Given the close constitutional scrutiny devoted to the TOA’s removal
restrictions, one might have expected similar discussion of the ICA’s
removal language. But there was none. The same Senator Hoar who
fiercely defended the President’s power to remove officers whose “conduct in office is to be determined by political theories or opinions” listed
the establishment of a commission as one of “four great objects which this
347. 18 Cong. Rec. 141 (1886) (statement of Sen. Hoar). Hoar had been a vocal
supporter of the Pendleton Act. See Sageser, supra note 279, at 52.
348. 18 Cong. Reg. 141 (statement of Sen. Hoar). Senator George Edmunds of
Vermont, in contrast, believed that the Tenure of Office Act was constitutional, and that an
executive officer, regardless of the political nature of the role, should be
secure in the administration of the office . . . he has been selected to perform for
the period fixed by the constitution of the State or by its law . . . and that nothing
but his official or personal misconduct—which is something else than having an
opinion and expressing it in an honest and manly way—should be the cause of
his dismissal from it.
Id. at 137 (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
349. Id. at 141 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
350. Id. at 216 (statement of Sen. Evarts) (emphasis added).
351. Id. at 216–17.
352. Id. at 217.
353. Id. at 216.
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bill accomplishe[d] which [he] heartily favor[ed].”354 Hoar’s complaint
was not that the commission was too independent of the President, but
that it was not independent enough. The ICC’s “half legislative, half
judicial” powers required even stronger protections against the “exposure
to temptation in the way of corruption” that commissioners would face in
the realm of national politics.355 Similarly, Senator Evarts, the emphatic
defender of presidential removal power during the Johnson Administration, criticized the ICA for unconstitutionally burdening interstate
commerce, but he never objected that its removal provisions unconstitutionally diminished the presidency.356
When it came to the ICA’s stipulations about presidential removal,
even the most zealous guardians of the Constitution and executive
authority were not concerned. Congress understood very well the limits
that were imposed by the ICA’s statutory language, and they also
understood pertinent consequences for the President’s power to issue
political and policy instructions. Against that familiar legal background,
the ICC was effectively a creature of the legislature, just like the state
commissions on which it was modeled. The commissioners were not the
“political” appointees whose removal Hoar and his colleagues assigned to
the President. In the eyes of Congress, commissioners were more like
short-term judges, addressing complaints by applying the rules laid down
in the ICA, funneling cases to the judiciary, and advising Congress on
future legislation. They did not look like part of the “Executive Branch.”
They looked like an arm of Congress.357
D. The Proliferation of Independent Agencies
This conception of commissions as legislative arms—agencies that
perform a mix of legislative and judicial tasks—persisted, as Congress
continued to use fixed terms leavened with removal permissions as a
means of striking a balance between agency oversight and independence.
In 1890, Congress created the Board of General Appraisers—a body it later
turned into an Article III court358—using INM to denote the circumstances
in which the President might remove the Board’s members prior to the
end of their terms.359 Woodrow Wilson’s presidency saw the creation of the
354. Id. at 141, 634 (statement of Sen. Hoar).
355. Id. at 639.
356. Id. at 604 (statement of Sen. Evarts).
357. Cf. United States v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284, 296 (1854) (presenting the plaintiff in
error’s argument that territorial judges “are legislative officers, and not executive officers,
because it is to congress and not to the President, that the power of making rules respecting
the territory of the United States has been committed”).
358. 28 U.S.C. § 251 (2018).
359. Customs Administrative Act of 1890, ch. 407, § 12, 26 Stat. 131, 136 (creating the
now-defunct position of general appraiser of the merchandise and providing that appraisers
“may be removed from office at any time by the President for [INM]”); see also Shurtleff v.
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FTC360 and the Tariff Commission,361 both with members tenured for a
term of years subject to removal by the President for only INM.362 And, in
1913, Congress established the Federal Reserve Board and made its
members subject to removal “for cause.”363
Congress continued to draw on the ICA and its progeny throughout
the twentieth century, creating over a dozen agencies using various
combinations of INM, including the Occupational Health and Review
Commission, the Chemical Safety Board, the Consumer Product Safety
Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the FEC, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Commission

United States, 189 U.S. 311, 313–15 (1903) (considering the President’s authority to remove
an appraiser); supra note 137 (discussing Shurtleff in light of the Four Years’ Law).
360. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 1, 38 Stat. 717, 717–18 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2018)).
361. Revenue Act, ch. 463, § 700, 39 Stat. 756, 795 (1916).
362. In 1912, Congress also passed the Lloyd–LaFollette Act, which provided that “no
person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except
for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service.” Lloyd–LaFollette Act, ch. 389,
§ 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3103, 5501, 7351 (2018)).
363. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 260 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 241 (2018)). Congress used this language at least once previously when it created a
consular court. See Act Creating a United States Court for China, ch. 3934, § 7, 34 Stat. 816
(1906). And it used the language again in 1916 when it created the Federal Farm Loan
Board. Federal Farm Loan Act, ch. 245, § 3, 39 Stat. 360, 360 (1916). Today, “for cause” is
a common removal ground, limiting the tenure of at least a dozen officials. See, e.g., infra
Appendix B.
Where Congress enables the President to remove an official “for cause” or “for good
cause,” the language is best interpreted to encompass any of the recognized removal causes
contained in the U.S. Code, including INM, immorality, ineligibility, offenses involving
moral turpitude, and conviction of a crime. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 app. A at 549–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (cataloging removal
grounds). Thus, the President’s power to remove Federal Reserve governors is greater than
it is over many other independent agency heads. See Datla & Revesz, supra note 1, at 588
(“Statutes that specify that an appointee cannot be removed except for ‘good cause’ confer
the weakest protection.”). This difference may seem surprising to a contemporary audience.
But it is consistent with the President’s power to remove the then-primary bank regulator,
the Comptroller of the Currency, see 12 U.S.C. § 2, and President Wilson’s insistence that a
“government board” oversee the twelve Federal Reserve Banks, see Roger Lowenstein,
America’s Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve 198–216 (2015)
(explaining the development of Wilson’s plan for a government-controlled central bank
under the dominion of the Treasury Department). Indeed, until 1935, the Fed’s Board was
substantially more integrated with the executive branch than the ICC or FTC, as the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency—both removable by the
President without cause—served on the Board, with the Secretary serving as “chairman.”
Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 260–61 (1913). Congress may also have used
the more expansive “for cause” language in the Federal Reserve Act in reaction to President
Taft’s removal for INM earlier the same year of two members of the Board of General
Appraisers, one of whom was accused of being intoxicated while on duty. See Bamzai, supra
note 137, at 737.
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on Civil Rights, the Sentencing Commission, the OSC, the NTSB, and the
Federal Maritime Commission.364
Congress also created term-of-years offices within executive departments,365 permitting presidential removal “for cause,” for INM, or for
other specified grounds. For example, the National Appeals Division of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture is headed by a Director appointed by
the Agriculture Secretary who “shall not be subject to removal during the
term of office, except for cause.”366 The FHFA, created in 2008 to ensure
the safety and soundness of various government banks and sponsored
financial enterprises, is led by a Director, who is appointed by the
President and removable only for cause.367 Members of the Surface
Transportation Board are appointed for terms of five years, and “[t]he
President may remove” them “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”368 INM also figures in enabling laws creating the
Foreign Service Grievance Board, a division of the State Department;369
the Board of Veterans Appeals, a part of the VA;370 and the National Indian
Gaming Commission, housed in the Department of the Interior.371

364. See infra Appendix B.
365. Executive departments are parts of the federal government headed by officers who
serve at the pleasure of the President. 5 U.S.C. § 101.
366. 7 U.S.C. § 6992(b)(2) (2018).
367. 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2). The constitutionality of this arrangement is currently in
dispute, with the Supreme Court considering this Term whether the for-cause limitation on
the President’s removal authority over the FHFA Director violates the separation of powers.
Collins v. Mnuchin, 896 F.3d 640 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, No. 19-422, 2020 WL
3865248 (U.S. July 9, 2020). Although, as mentioned, “for cause” removal is broader than
INM, see supra note 363, this text and the legislative history of these statutes are best read
to foreclose removal based on policy disagreement. See infra Part III.
More significant for the Article II dispute in Collins is the fact that the challenged
agency decision was made by an acting director whose tenure is not governed by the forcause provision. Court-appointed amicus has raised this point. See Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae at 14, Collins, No. 19-422 (filed Oct. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Collins
Brief] (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion “that an Acting Director has the same
tenure protection as a Senate-confirmed Director” is “incorrect”); cf. Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Actings, 120 Colum. L. Rev. 613, 690 (2020) (noting that neither the FHFA’s
acting-director provisions nor the Vacancies Act restricts removal). The at-will removability
of the Acting Director is clear from the fact that, unlike the Senate-confirmed Director, the
Acting Director is not appointed to any term. See section II.A (explaining that the tenureprotecting language in enabling acts is the text regarding the term of years). Amicus also
makes this point. See Collins Brief, supra, at 14 (noting that “the Acting Director does not
have a term at all”). Thus, the Senate-confirmed Director’s protection depends not on the
scope of the “for cause” provision but on the fact that, in contrast to an Acting Director, a
Senate-appointed FHFA Director is appointed to a five-year term.
368. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(3) (2018).
369. 22 U.S.C. § 4135(d) (2018).
370. 38 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2) (2018).
371. 25 U.S.C. § 2704(b)(6) (2018).
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The legislative histories of these acts reflect Congress’s desire to
duplicate the judicial-style independence of the ICA. This desire is
apparent in the debates over the independence of the Federal Reserve
Board during the 1930s.372 It can be seen in the way Congress characterized FTC Commissioners in debates in the 1940s,373 and in the understandings that animated efforts at government reorganization after World War
II.374 It shows up in testimony on the Maritime Commission in 1945, when
the Chairman of the House Committee on Accounts explained that the
Commission “is an independent establishment—an arm of Congress—
exercising quasi-judicial powers and powers legislative in character” and
that appointments to the Commission were made “with the purpose of
maintaining the Commission independent from political influence
and . . . the changing policies or direct influences of a particular
administration.”375
It is the view espoused in 1977 by President Jimmy Carter, who, in
proposing legislation to create the FERC—whose three members would
serve four-year terms and be removable for INM—underscored the
importance of “guard[ing] the quasi-judicial aspects of the regulatory
process against improper influence” by establishing a Board of Hearings

372. Banking Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1715 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on
Banking & Currency, 74th Cong. 504–06 (1935) (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury) (explaining that he wanted to see the government’s monetary
powers concentrated in a body that was independent of the President and whose members
could not be removed short of impeachment).
373. 87 Cong. Rec. 8165 (1941) (statement of Rep. Hobbs) (“Humphrey was a man who
occupied a quasi[-]judicial as well as a quasi[-]legislative position, a member of the Federal
Trade Commission. This body is not within the executive department, and must be free
from executive control.”).
374. See, e.g., Letter from John L. Rogers, Chairman, Interstate Com. Comm’n, to Hon.
Carter Manasco, Chairman, Comm. on Expenditures in Exec. Dep’ts, House of
Representatives (Sept. 10, 1945), in To Provide for Reorganizing Agencies of the
Government, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 3325 Before the H. Comm. on
Expenditures in the Exec. Dep’ts, 79th Cong. 121 (1945) (“[The ICC] was created by the
Congress to carry on legislative functions under rules and principles laid down by the
Congress . . . . [T]he Commission was set up in 1889 and has functioned ever since as an
arm of the Congress, subject to review by the courts . . . .”). On the history of twentiethcentury administrative reorganization efforts, see generally Ronald C. Moe, Administrative
Renewal: Reorganization Commissions in the 20th Century (2003). On Congress’s and the
executive branch’s extended push and pull over control of the administrative state, see Josh
Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers 292–
95 (2017).
375. 91 Cong. Rec. 11,958, 11,965 (1945) (statement of Rep. Bland). This
understanding of commissions might also explain why they tend to be run by many
members, despite the superior efficacy of single-director agencies. See Ganesh Sitaraman &
Ariel Dobkin, The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and Multimember
Commissions, 71 Admin. L. Rev. 719, 723–24 (2019).
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and Appeals “free from the control of the Secretary of Energy.”376 And it
is the understanding expressed in 1978 by the Civil Service Commission,
which explained that in designing the tenure of the members of the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), it used “inefficiency, neglect of duty
and malfeasance in office” because that was the language Congress had
always used “to confer upon [an independent regulatory agency’s]
members a tenure akin to that of the Federal judiciary.”377 Although a
detailed review of the legislative histories of the dozens of independent
agencies created on the model of the ICC is beyond the scope of this
Article, by the late-twentieth century, INM had become talismanic: a combination of words that Congress routinely paired with fixed terms in order
to protect the members of a regulatory body from political interference.378
III. RECONSTRUCTING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
This Part addresses the questions Part I raises, indicating the ways in
which the historical evidence Part II amasses complicates expansive
theories of presidential power. In so doing, this Part provides ballast for
two of the arguments advanced by Justice Kagan in her dissent in Seila Law.
First, it uses the historical evidence Part II adduces to critique the
hypothesis that INM provisions permit the President to fire agency officials
for policy disagreements or for failing to follow presidential directives. The
history of removal statutes shows that they were not written to empower
executives to direct the actions of term-tenured officials but to make it
easier for the government to check unfaithful and incapable
administrators. Scholars who argue otherwise can of course ground their
claims in other approaches to statutory or constitutional interpretation.
But in recovering the meaning of INM and vindicating the congressional
design behind independent agencies, this Article demonstrates that
legislative and statutory history do not support such an expansive reading
of the three permissions. Second, for those who view presidential removal
authority as a matter to be decided by resort to constitutional “first
principles,” this Article shows how an expansive reading of the Take Care
Clause can nonetheless be reconciled with removal law. By recovering the
meaning of “neglect of duty” and “malfeasance in office,” Parts II and III
376. Jimmy Carter, Remarks on Proposed Department of Energy Legislation (March 1,
1977), in S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 95th Cong., Executive Energy Documents 372
(Comm. Print 1978).
377. Civil Service Reform: Hearings on H.R. 11280 Before the H. Comm. on Post Off.
& Civ. Serv., 95th Cong. 824 (1978).
378. This interpretation of INM was also shared by Presidents, administrators, and
scholars. See, e.g., Edward Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1957, at 90–98
(4th ed. 1957); Corwin, Tenure of Office, supra note 335, at 357 (noting that Presidents did
not veto or protest statutes creating independent agencies). See generally Reorganization
of the Government Agencies: Hearings on S. 2700 Before the S. Select Comm. on Gov’t
Org., 75th Cong. (Aug. 11, 1937) (presenting the testimony of various independent
commissioners on the topic).
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bolster the argument, implicit in Justice Kagan’s Seila Law dissent, that the
President’s power to remove agency officials for neglect of duty or
malfeasance is the constitutional equivalent of the authority to remove
officials who fail to faithfully fulfill their duties.
A.

Policy Disagreements Are Not Cause

As Part II’s history reveals, INM provisions were not designed to
permit the President to direct independent agencies to take certain
actions and then remove officials who fail to comply. Nor were they meant
to permit the President to remove agency officials taking actions
inconsistent with the President’s policy agenda. INM provisions empower
the President to remove for-cause officials who otherwise enjoy tenure in
office for a term of years. For-cause removal is a legal process, requiring
notice and a hearing,379 and just as impeachment does not empower
Congress to direct the President to execute statutory and constitutional
responsibilities in any particular manner, for-cause removal does not serve
as a source of presidential authority over other government officials.
Accordingly, it does not seem likely that agency officials can, as a matter
of law, be said to neglect their duties by declining to follow presidential
directives, unless those directives are authorized by the Constitution or
some other provision of the U.S. Code.380 Nor is it likely that agency
officials who pursue policies inconsistent with the President’s agenda can
be found inefficient as a matter of law. Inefficiency relates to an official’s
capacity to carry out statutory obligations. Although this term was added
to expand the President’s supervisory remit beyond faithful execution, it
was not intended to give the President authority over an official’s exercise
of their lawful discretion. Instead, it was meant to allow Presidents to
379. See Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 314 (1903) (“It must be presumed that
the President did not make the removal for [inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office] . . . because there was given to the officer no notice or opportunity to defend.”);
Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901) (“[W]here the term of office is for a fixed
period, notice and hearing are essential. If there were not [notice and hearing], the
appointing power could remove at pleasure or for such cause as it deemed sufficient.”); see
also Bd. of Trs. of Gillett v. People ex rel. Keith, 59 P. 72, 75 (Colo. App. 1899) (“To
authorize the removal of such an officer, there must be a charge of something which
constitutes a legal cause of amotion, and it must be sustained on a trial by competent legal
evidence. The proceedings on the trial are judicial in their nature.”); Andrews v. King, 77
Me. 224, 232 (1885) (“[T]he mayor and aldermen act under this statute, apart from their
mere municipal duties, and in a judicial capacity. The act of hearing and deciding is always
a judicial act. It should always be done, deliberately and without bias.”); Flomenbaum v.
Commonwealth, 889 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Mass. 2008) (describing how the Governor provided
notice and a hearing before removing a term-tenured official for cause); People ex rel.
Mayor of N.Y. v. Nichols, 79 N.Y. 582, 588–89 (1880) (“[T]he proceeding is judicial in its
character . . . .”).
380. In this regard, Sunstein and Vermeule’s recent argument that the President can
remove, for neglect of duty, officials who willfully fail to comply with the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act is compelling. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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remove officials who are incapable: the attribute, associated with the spoils
system, that the incorporation of the term “efficiency” into the civil service
lexicon was trying to eradicate.381
These conclusions are buttressed by the legislative history, which
strongly suggests that Congress viewed commissioners as legislative and
judicial agents, not as officials performing primarily executive functions.
There is no apparent support for the latter view in the debates leading to
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, or even the more recent deliberations involving the
Dodd–Frank Act.382 Indeed, legislators often intentionally separate
agencies from executive departments to ensure that they operate in a
nonpartisan fashion and are insulated from day-to-day political influence.
B.

For-Cause Removal Is Consistent with Even Expansive Readings of the Take
Care Clause

Although the Take Care Clause cannot be reconciled with agency
independence by expanding the concept of “inefficiency” to cover policy
disagreements, Congress has not been on an unconstitutional legislating
spree for the past 150 years either. The clearest reason for this is the one
given by Justice Holmes in dissent in Myers: “The duty of the President to
see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or
require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his
power.”383 But even assuming that the Take Care Clause gives the
President the authority to supervise term-tenured officers when those
officers exercise some part of the executive power, this reading can be
squared with independent agencies by recognizing that Congress designed
these agencies consistent with the President’s “duty to supervise.”384
381. The cases cited by the D.C. Circuit involving civil service members removed for
insubordination or for failing to follow orders, see, e.g., supra notes 91, 98, are inapposite
to inefficiency at independent agencies (unless those agency leaders are otherwise legally
obligated to follow presidential directions) because civil service members are legally
obligated to follow directives from other executive branch officials.
382. The Proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Implications for
Consumers and the FTC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com., Trade, & Consumer Prot.
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 111th Cong. 209 (2009) (statement of Jon Leibowitz,
Chairman, FTC) (“Four members of the Board would, like FTC Commissioners, be
appointed for specified terms and be removable only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office. This arrangement would provide a level of independence.”).
383. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Another
interpretation that reconciles agency independence with the Take Care Clause is Justice
McClean’s, asserted in his dissent in United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie. 58 U.S. 284, 310
(1854) (McClean, J., dissenting) (“My own view is, that the power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed, applies chiefly to the giving effect to the decisions of the courts when
resisted by physical force.”).
384. See Gillian Metzger, Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J. 1836, 1875–79
(2015).
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This approach vindicates over a century of legislative and administrative practice and explains the lack of debate in Congress over the
constitutionality of tenured officials removable only for cause in a record
otherwise replete with arguments objecting to legislative interference in
the executive branch.385 On this view, Congress, in erecting the
commission system, made room for the President’s constitutional obligations by permitting the President to remove unfaithful administrators.
Congress keyed the President’s removal authority to long-established
grounds for official liability—neglect of duty and malfeasance in office.
And it is no coincidence that in the case of the NLRB, SSA, Consumer
Product Safety Commission, Commission on Civil Rights, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Foreign Service Grievance Board, and Independent
Medicare Advisory Board, Congress limited the President’s removal
authority to those two causes alone.386 Article II, under Myers, could be said
to require this minimum delegation—but nothing more.
Of course, as discussed above, Congress has often decided to permit
the President to engage in additional oversight of independent agencies.
Congress has done this by adding inefficiency as a further ground meriting
removal. Part II shows that Congress’s purpose in adding inefficiency to
the removal mix was to remedy inept administration and to create a check
on sinecures and patronage appointments. In our view, these good
government checks go beyond the President’s constitutional duties
because Article II, by its plain text, does not put the President under a
constitutional obligation to eliminate incompetence, a shortcoming that
does not involve the breach of an official duty.
This way of reconciling removal law with the Take Care Clause also
accommodates the results of each of the major cases in the removal
canon.387 In Humphrey’s Executor, Congress was well within its rights to
tenure FTC commissioners for a term of years and limit the President’s
ability to remove them to circumstances involving inefficiency and a failure
to faithfully execute the law. And in Bowsher, the Court correctly decided
385. The notion that faithful execution obligates the President to remove officers who
unfaithfully execute their duties dates to James Madison. Daily Advertiser, June 22, 1789,
reprinted in Documentary History, supra note 121, at 895, 895–96.
386. See infra Appendix B.
387. The problem in Myers, on this view, was not tenured agency officers per se, but the
fact that Congress gave itself a role in removing them, the cabined reading that Humphrey’s
Executor made explicit nine years later. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
630–31 (1934). On this speculative reconciliation, and per Madison’s position in the
Decision of 1789, the Constitution prevents Congress from arrogating to itself a role in the
removal of executive officers. In remedying the constitutional defect, Myers left untouched
the removal standard—although Congress tenured Myers for a term of years, it also
specified his removability at pleasure—changing only the actors involved. In other words,
the Court’s remedy in Myers was to read out the portion of the law implicating Congress in
the removal decision, which left the President with power to remove the postmaster at his
pleasure.
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that Congress exceeded its constitutional powers by giving itself a role in
executing the laws. When Chief Justice Burger wrote that the INM
standard was “very broad,”388 it was in the context of observing that the law
had stripped the courts of jurisdiction to review a congressional decision
to remove the Comptroller General. The Court’s language, therefore, can
be read as expressing concern that Congress might interpret the standard
loosely absent judicial review.389
Free Enterprise, on this interpretation, was correctly decided because
the relevant enabling statute did not permit the President to remove
PCAOB officials for a failure to faithfully execute the law. But the Court’s
choice of remedy was wrong. The Court corrected the defect in the statute
by declaring that PCAOB members were removable by the SEC at will.390 A
better approach would have been to make PCAOB members subject to
presidential removal for a failure of faithful execution—i.e., for neglect of
duty and malfeasance in office. This is the power that the Constitution
arguably gives to the President. There does not appear to be any basis,
even under a broad reading of Article II, for the Court to redefine the
relationship between various agency officers (i.e., between SEC
commissioners and PCAOB members).
Finally, this reconciliation comports with the majority’s view in PHH
Corp. and suggests why the majority in Seila Law seemed reluctant to rely
on the Take Care Clause to strike down the removal provisions regarding
the CFPB director.391 In the body of the opinion, the Court cited
“separation of powers” and “first principles” rather than relying primarily
on specific constitutional text, leaving the bulk of its discussion of the
Clause to a footnote.392 Moreover, the dissent implied precisely the
correspondence argued for here, such that this Part can be read as
unpacking some of the doctrinal implications of the dissent’s implicit
equivalence between “NM” and “a failure to faithfully execute the law.”393
Although the concepts of neglect of duty and malfeasance in office are not
“very broad,” they are broad enough to accommodate even a broad
interpretation of the President’s constitutional duties.

388. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986).
389. And while the Court might have remedied the defect in the Deficit Reduction Act
by concluding that the Comptroller General was removable for a failure of faithful
execution by the President but not by the Congress, id. at 734–36, it understandably chose
not to take this route given the clear intent of Congress to insulate the Comptroller General
from executive influence.
390. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509 (2010).
391. See supra note 103.
392. See Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2206–07, 2206
n.11 (2020).
393. See id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment with respect to severability
and dissenting in part) (“[INM] would allow the President to discharge the Director for a
failure to ‘faithfully execute[]’ the law, as well as for basic incompetence.” (quoting U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3)).
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CONCLUSION
This Article begins with two questions. First, it asks under what circumstances the President can remove agency administrators tenured for a
term of years. Second, it asks whether, if those circumstances are limited—
if independent agencies really are independent—such independence can
be reconciled with the President’s constitutional obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed. Drawing on previously overlooked
sources, this Article then recovers the lost history of removal law, showing
that for-cause removal provisions were not primarily designed to protect
agency independence. Rather, they emerged to place a limit on that
independence by facilitating the removal of officials who otherwise
enjoyed a secure tenure in office for a stated term of years. In identifying
the appropriate limits of official independence—in adding provisions to
permit removal for inefficiency, neglect of duty, and malfeasance in
office—legislators incorporated terms aimed at eradicating unfaithful
administration and incompetence. “Neglect of duty” and “malfeasance in
office” have their roots in the English common law and were the terms
courts traditionally used to describe an official’s failure to faithfully
execute his office. “Inefficiency,” by contrast, was added to the removal
lexicon in the middle of the nineteenth century by legislators concerned
with public debt and wasteful spending. By drawing a line at INM,
Congress created agencies designed to be independent of the President.
But this independence comported with the President’s constitutional
obligations even on an expansive reading of Article II. Any attempt to
enlarge the President’s removal authority beyond the limits Congress
intended must grapple with this historical record.

72

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1

APPENDIX A: SPECTRUM OF AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
For Cause

Postal Regulatory Commission
U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors
Legal Services Corporation

INM+†

National Mediation Board
State Justice Institute
U.S. Institute of Peace Board of Directors
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Independence

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Federal Maritime Commission
INM

Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission
Federal Trade Commission
Merit Systems Protection Board
National Transportation Safety Board
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
Office of Special Counsel
Consumer Product Safety Commission
National Labor Relations Board

NM

Social Security Administration Commissioner
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
U.S. Sentencing Commission

† INM+ refers to agencies whose enabling acts include INM as well as other removal
grounds such as immorality, ineligibility, offenses involving moral turpitude, and conviction
of a felony.
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Federal Communications Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Specified Term
(1926–1935)††

National Credit Union Administration
Railroad Retirement Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
U.S. International Trade Commission
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board
Arctic Research Commission

Independence

Broadcasting Board of Governors
Commission of Fine Arts
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Specified
Term

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Farm Credit Administration Board
Federal Election Commission
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board
Marine Mammal Commission
Millennium Challenge Corporation
National Council on Disability
National Labor-Management Panel
National Science Foundation

†† The table distinguishes between two types of agencies with term-tenured officials
and no removal permissions: those whose enabling acts were written after Myers was decided
but before Humphrey’s Executor and those whose acts were written either before Myers was
decided or after Humphrey’s Executor. It is fairly clear that Congress intended to deprive the
President of any removal authority over the latter agency heads. It is less clear what Congress
intended with respect to the agencies created in the period between Myers and Humphrey’s
Executor. Congress may have read the dicta in Myers, until it was repudiated by Humphrey’s
Executor, to give the President a constitutional power to remove agency officials in certain
circumstances and thus did not include removal permissions. The agencies with a specified
term are the most independent of the President, as Congress has given the President no
removal authority over their leaders. The agencies at the opposite end of the spectrum—
those the President can remove for cause—are the least independent, as Congress has given
the President authority to remove their leaders for a range of judicially recognized “causes.”
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APPENDIX B†††
Year
1863
1864
1887

1890
1893
1906
1910
1913

1913

1914
1916
1916

1916
1916
1917

1920
1921

1922

Agency/Office
Comptroller of
the Currency
Comptroller of
the Currency
Interstate
Commerce
Commission
Board of General
Appraisers
Civil Service
Commission
Court for China
Commission of
Fine Arts
Board of
Governors of the
Federal Reserve
System
Board of
Mediation and
Conciliation
Federal Trade
Commission
Federal Farm
Loan Board
U.S. Employees’
Compensation
Commission
U.S. Shipping
Board
U.S. Tariff
Commission
Federal Board of
Vocational
Education
Railroad Labor
Board
Comptroller
General, General
Accounting Office
U.S. Coal
Commission

Provision
ch. 58, § 1, 12
Stat. 665 (1863).
12 U.S.C. § 2
(2018).
ch. 104, § 11, 24
Stat. 383 (1887).

Term
5 years

ch. 407, § 12, 26
Stat. 136 (1890).
ch. 27, § 1, 22
Stat. 403 (1883).
ch. 3934, § 7, 34
Stat. 816 (1906).
40 U.S.C.
§ 9101(b) (2018).
12 U.S.C. § 242
(2018).

None

ch. 6, § 11, 38
Stat. 108 (1913).

7 years

15 U.S.C. § 41
(2018).
ch. 245, § 3, 39
Stat. 360 (1916).
ch. 458, § 28, 39
Stat. 748 (1916).

7 years

ch. 451, § 3, 39
Stat. 729 (1916).
ch. 463, § 700, 39
Stat. 795 (1916).
ch. 114, § 6, 39
Stat. 932 (1917).

6 years

ch. 91, § 304, 41
Stat. 470 (1920).
ch. 18, § 303, 42
Stat. 23 (1921).

5 years

ch. 412, § 1, 42
Stat. 1023 (1922).

1 year

AP

FC

I

N

M

5 years
6 years

None
10 years
4 years
14
years*

8 years
6 years

12 years
3 years

15 years

††† Legend—AP: Statute permits presidential removal at pleasure. FC: Statute uses
“for cause.” I: Statute uses “inefficiency.” N: Statute uses “neglect of duty.” *: Statute has
been amended; entry reflects current law.
Squares in lighter gray feature similar, but different, language. A spreadsheet with
specific provisions is available from the authors upon request.
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1924
1926
1927
1930
1930

1932
1933

1934

1934
1934

1934

1935

1935

1935
1935
1944

1945

1947

1947

1950
1958

THE THREE PERMISSIONS
Board of Tax
Appeals
National
Mediation Board
Federal Radio
Commission
Federal Power
Commission
U.S. International
Trade
Commission
Federal Home
Loan Bank Board
Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
Federal
Communications
Commission
Federal Housing
Administration
National Credit
Union
Administration
Securities and
Exchange
Commission
Commissioner,
Social Security
Administration
National
Bituminous Coal
Commission
National Labor
Relations Board
Railroad
Retirement Board
National Advisory
Council on
National Health
Service Corps
Export–Import
Bank of the
United States
Director, Central
Intelligence
Agency
National Labor
Management
Panel
National Science
Foundation
Board of Veterans
Appeals

ch. 234, § 900, 43
Stat. 336 (1924).
45 U.S.C. § 154
(2018).
ch. 169, § 3, 44
Stat. 1162 (1927).
16 U.S.C. § 792
(2018).
19 U.S.C.
§ 1330(b) (2018).

12 years

ch. 522, § 17, 47
Stat. 736 (1932).
12 U.S.C.
§ 1812(c)(1)
(2018).
47 U.S.C.
§ 154(c)(1)(A)
(2018).
ch. 847, § 1, 48
Stat. 1246 (1934).
12 U.S.C.
§ 1752a(c)
(2018).
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2018).

6 years

42 U.S.C.
§ 902(a)(3)
(2018).
ch. 824, § 2, 49
Stat. 992 (1935).

6 years

29 U.S.C. § 153(a)
(2018).
45 U.S.C.
§ 231f(a) (2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 254j(b)(1)
(2018).

5 years

12 U.S.C.
§ 635a(c)(8)(A)
(2018).
50 U.S.C. § 3036
(2018).

4 years

29 U.S.C. § 175(a)
(2018).

3 years

42 U.S.C. § 1861
(2018).
38 U.S.C.
§ 7101(b)(2)
(2018).

6 years

3 years
6 years
5 years
9 years

6 years

5 years

4 years
6 years

5 years

4 years

5 years
3 years

None

6 years
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1961

1965

1970

1970

1970

1970

1971

1972

1972

1973

1974

1974

Director and
Deputy Director,
Peace Corps
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission
Chemical Safety
and Hazard
Investigation
Board
Inspector General
of the U.S. Postal
Service
Occupational
Safety and Health
Review
Commission
U.S. Postal Service
Board of
Governors
Farm Credit
Administration
Board
Consumer
Product Safety
Commission
Marine Mammal
Commission
Architectural and
Transportation
Barriers
Compliance
Board
Commodity
Futures Trading
Commission
Federal Election
Commission

1974

Legal Services
Corporation

1974

Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
Pension Benefit
Guaranty
Corporation
U.S. Institute of
Peace Board of
Directors

1974

1975

22 U.S.C. § 2503
(2018).

None

42 U.S.C. § 2000e4(a) (2018).

5 years

42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(r)(6)(B)
(2018).

5 years

39 U.S.C.
§ 202(e)(3)
(2018).
29 U.S.C. § 661(b)
(2018).

7 years

39 U.S.C.
§ 202(a)(1),
(b)(1) (2018).
12 U.S.C.
§ 2242(b) (2018).

7 years

15 U.S.C.
§ 2053(a) (2018).

7 years

16 U.S.C.
§ 1401(b)(2)
(2018).
29 U.S.C.
§ 792(a)(2)(A)(i)
(2018).

3 years

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)
(2018).

5 years

52 U.S.C.
§ 30106(a)(2)(A)
(2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 2996c(b), (e)
(2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 5841(c), (e)
(2018).
29 U.S.C. § 1302
(2018).

6 years

22 U.S.C.
§ 4605(e), (f)
(2018).

4 years

6 years

6 years

4 years*

3 years

5 years

None
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1976

1976

1977

1977

1978

1978
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Administrator and
Chief Actuary,
Centers for
Medicare and
Medicaid Services
Regional Fishery
Management
Councils (Eight)
Federal Energy
Regulatory
Commission
Federal Mine
Safety and Health
Review
Commission
Federal Labor
Relations
Authority
Merit Systems
Protection Board

1980

Foreign Service
Grievance Board

1980

Foreign Service
Labor Relations
Board
U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights

1983

1984
1984

1984

1984
1986

1988

1988

1989
1994

Arctic Research
Commission
National Archives
and Records
Administration
State Justice
Institute Board of
Directors
U.S. Sentencing
Commission
Federal
Retirement Thrift
Investment Board
Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety
Board
National Indian
Gaming
Commission
Office of Special
Counsel
Broadcasting
Board of
Governors

42 U.S.C.
§ 1317(b)(1)
(2018).

None

16 U.S.C.
§ 1852(b)(3), (6)
(2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 7171(b)(1)
(2018).
30 U.S.C.
§ 823(b)(1)
(2018).

3 years

5 U.S.C.
§ 7104(b), (c)
(2018).
5 U.S.C.
§ 1202(a), (d)
(2018).
22 U.S.C.
§ 4135(b), (d)
(2018).
22 U.S.C.
§ 4106(e) (2018).

5 years

42 U.S.C.
§ 1975(c), (e)
(2018).
15 U.S.C.
§ 4102(c) (2018).
44 U.S.C. § 2103
(2018).

6 years

42 U.S.C.
§ 10703(b), (h)
(2018).
28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(2018).
5 U.S.C.
§ 8472(e)(1)
(2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 2286(d)(2)
(2018).
25 U.S.C.
§ 2704(b) (2018).

3 years

5 U.S.C. § 1211(b)
(2018).
22 U.S.C.
§ 6203(b)(2)
(2018).

5 years

5 years

6 years

7 years

2 years

3 years

4 years
None

6 years
4/3/2
years*
5 years

3 years

3 years
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1994

1994

1994

1995

1996

1996
1996
1996

1998

1998

1999

2000

2002

2003

2004
2004

2006

Director, National
Appeals Division,
Department of
Agriculture
Joint Staff of the
National Guard
Bureau
National
Transportation
Safety Board
Surface
Transportation
Board
Administrator and
Chief Actuary,
Social Security
Administration
Chief of Air Force
Reserve
Chief of Navy
Reserve
Commander,
Marine Forces
Reserve
National Council
on Disability
PerformanceBased
Organization for
the Delivery of
Federal Student
Financial
Assistance
Director of the
Coast Guard
Reserve
Medicare-Eligible
Retiree Health
Care Board of
Actuaries
Public Company
Accounting
Oversight Board
Air Traffic
Services
Committee
Copyright Royalty
Judgeships
Millennium
Challenge
Corporation
Federal Maritime
Commission

7 U.S.C. § 6992(b)
(2018).

6 years

10 U.S.C.
§ 10506(a)(3)(A)
(2018).
49 U.S.C.
§ 1111(c) (2018).

4 years

49 U.S.C.
§ 1301(b)(3)
(2018).
42 U.S.C.
§ 902(c)(1)
(2018).

5 years

10 U.S.C.
§ 9038(c) (2018).
10 U.S.C.
§ 8083(c) (2018).
10 U.S.C.
§ 8084(c) (2018).

4 years

29 U.S.C.
§ 780(b)(1)
(2018).
20 U.S.C.
§ 1018(d)(3)
(2018).

3 years

14 U.S.C.
§ 309(c)(1)
(2018).
10 U.S.C.
§ 1114(a)(2)(A)
(2018).

2–4
years

15 U.S.C.
§ 7211(e)(6)
(2018).
49 U.S.C.
§ 106(p)(6)(G)
(2018).
17 U.S.C. § 802(i)
(2018).
22 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c)(4)(B)
(i) (2018).
46 U.S.C.
§ 301(b)(3)
(2018).

5 years

5 years

None

4 years
4 years

3–5
years

15 years

3 years

6 years
3 years

5 years
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2006
2008

2008

2009
2010

2010
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Postal Regulatory
Commission
Defense
Department
Board of Actuaries
Director, Federal
Housing Finance
Agency
Corporation for
Travel Promotion
Consumer
Financial
Protection Bureau
Independent
Medicare Advisory
Board

39 U.S.C. § 502(a)
(2018).
10 U.S.C.
§ 183(b)(3)
(2018).
12 U.S.C.
§ 4512(b)(2)
(2018).
22 U.S.C.
§ 2131(b) (2018).
12 U.S.C.
§ 5491(c)(3)
(2018).
Pub. L. No. 111148, § 3403
(g)(2)–(4), 124
Stat. 119, 503--04
(2010).

6 years
15 years

5 years

3 years
5 years

6 years

79

80

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:1

